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Article

The Presumption of Patentability
Sean B. Seymore

†

[P]resumptions . . . are the mere artificial creatures of law, depending
1
entirely on considerations of legal policy and convenience . . . .

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) has
2
come under fire for issuing patents of questionable quality.
Patent quality can be defined as “the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards of patentability—most importantly, to [cover inventions which are] novel,
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1. 3 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
AND DIGEST OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1225–26 (London, J. & W. T. Clarke 1824).
2. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 74 (2004) (describing what can happen when the Patent Office
“falls down on the job”); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social
Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 61–76 (2006) (exploring criticisms); Mark
A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (same); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty:
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667,
689 (2004) (“The Patent Office . . . appears to grant many patents that, when
carefully scrutinized, fail to meet basic patentability standards.”); John R.
Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 316–22 [hereinafter Thomas, Collusion] (exploring the patent quality crisis).
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nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.” Famous
examples of questionable patents include one for a motorized
4
ice cream cone, an umbrella to protect beer cans from sun5
6
light, a method of exercising a cat with a laser pointer, and a
7
method for sending signals faster than the speed of light.
8
Aside from being technically invalid, commentators have ar9
gued that such patents are worthless and burdensome on the
10
patent system.
3. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009); see also JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 171
(presenting a similar definition). From an economic perspective, a high-quality
patent is “one that covers an invention that would not otherwise be made [but
for the incentive of a patent] or one that ensures that a good idea is commercialized . . . .” Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the
U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 989, 991 (2004). The conditions for patentability are found in Title
35 of the United States Code. In short, the claimed invention must be useful,
novel, nonobvious, and directed to patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101–103 (2006). In addition, § 112 para. 1 requires that the application adequately describe, enable, and set forth the best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention; and § 112 para. 2 requires that the application conclude
with claims that delineate the invention with particularity. 35 U.S.C. § 112
para. 1–2.
4. Motorized Ice Cream Cone, U.S. Patent No. 5,971,829 (filed Mar. 6,
1998).
5. Beerbrella, U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (filed Oct. 19, 2001).
6. Method of Exercising a Cat, U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2,
1993).
7. Hyper-Light-Speed Antenna, U.S. Patent No. 6,025,810 (filed Oct. 2,
1997). It is well accepted in science that a signal cannot travel faster than the
speed of light. See, e.g., ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION
OF PHYSICS 149 (1966) (explaining special relativity); Dennis Overbye, Particles Faster Than the Speed of Light? Not So Fast, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2011, at D3 (noting that despite recent claims to the contrary, physicists
still agree with Einstein).
8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003) [hereinafter
FTC REPORT] (“A poor quality or questionable patent is one that is likely invalid or contains claims that are overly broad.”).
9. See Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and
Marks, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122–23 (1990) (“[M]ost issued patents
are worthless, or very nearly worthless.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 603 (1999) (“[M]ost
[patented] technologies will not be economically viable or commercially successful . . . .”).
10. John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727,
731 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, Patent Administration Reform] (explaining
that legal actors must often revisit the Patent Office’s work to assess patent
validity).
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The quality problem has been ascribed by different commentators to many different causes. For example, some assert
that the Patent Office’s current compensation system favors is11
suance over denial and rewards throughput over thorough ex12
amination.
Perhaps most emblematic of this qualitycompromising incentive structure is the Patent Office’s self13
declared mission to “help [its] customers get patents.” Others
argue that examiners lack adequate technical information,
14
such as access to the relevant prior art, needed to perform a
15
rigorous examination. And others contend that the Patent Of16
fice’s limited resources
(which contribute to the well-

11. See, e.g., ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY 97–98 (2001) (discussing an examiner’s concerns and incentives); Joseph Farrell & Robert P.
Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 945 (2004) (arguing that the skewed incentives of the current regime “make it easier and more desirable for examiners to
grant patents rather than reject them”); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 n.3 (2001) [hereinafter
Lemley, Rational Ignorance] (“[E]xaminers must write up reasons for rejection, but not reasons for allowance, giving them more incentives to allow rather than reject an application.”).
12. See Patrick A. Doody, How to Eliminate the Backlog at the Patent Office, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 395, 409–18 (2009) (describing examiners’ incentives and
production goals); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1496 n.3 (describing the push for examiners to issue patents irrespective of quality).
13. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE REVIEW: CREATING A PATENT AND TRADEMARK SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 8 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For criticisms, see Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1496 n.3
(“While the job of the PTO is certainly to issue good patents, it is also to reject
bad ones.”); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 692–93 (2010) (arguing that this mission sets the stage
for inadequate screening of patent applications).
14. “Prior art” refers to preexisting knowledge and technology already
available to the public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (defining the documents and
activities that can serve as prior art); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). The invention is compared to the prior art in assessing novelty and nonobviousness. See infra notes 160–61. But see Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for
the Presumption of Validity 12 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper
No. 401, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 (finding through
an empirical study that “examiners focus almost exclusively on art they find
themselves [as compared to art provided by the applicant] in considering
whether a patent application is new and nonobvious”).
15. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 28, 295 and accompanying text.
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17

publicized backlog) preclude a thorough review of applica18
tions.
Yet, it would be unfair to cast all of the blame for failings
in patent examination on the Patent Office. Several commentators have long argued that the substantive standards of pat19
entability are too low. Or, put simply, it is too easy to get a
20
(bad) patent. This criticism deserves attention because adjusting these standards is considered the principal tool for modu21
lating the scope, frequency, and quality of patents. Indeed,
tightening the standards of patentability has been a major goal
22
of judicial efforts at patent reform. In a series of landmark de17. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, U.S. Sets 21st-Century Goal: Building a Better Patent Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A1 (providing backlog statistics
and partly attributing the recent surge in applications to the Internet age).
One cause for the backlog is an increase in the number of patent application
filings over time while the time available for examiners to review applications
has remained constant. See John L. King, Patent Examination Procedures and
Patent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 54, 63 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (presenting an empirical study).
18. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46 (2007).
19. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE
162–63 (2008) (exploring the decline in patent quality and attributing the
weakening of patentability standards to the Federal Circuit); JAFFE &
LERNER, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that weak novelty and nonobviousness
standards have led to patents of dubious quality).
20. Cf. Adam B. Jaffe, Patent Reform: No Time Like the Present, 4 I/S: J.L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 59, 59 (2008) (“Changes in patent law and practice in
the last two decades have made the system less effective, by making it too easy
to get patents on trivial and non-original ideas . . . .”); Matthew Sag & Kurt
Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15
(2007) (“One of the most pressing problems in the patent system today is not
that patents in general are too easy to obtain or too easy to enforce; rather it is
that bad patents are too easy to obtain and enforce.”).
21. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 142 (2009) (using the biotechnology industry
to demonstrate the benefits of tailored standards). Admittedly, the term “quality” can be an ambiguous or normatively laden term. This Article uses a consistent definition throughout. See supra text accompanying note 3.
22. Patentability standards evolve primarily through judicial rather than
legislative action. See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the
Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 544 (2010) (explaining that patent law “has traditionally had a common law feel to it” because the courts receive little guidance from statutory sources); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge
Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New
Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (1994) (explaining that the “general”
nature of the patent statutes requires the Federal Circuit to “unavoidably fill[]
in gaps and develop[] fine points”); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (noting that the common law is “the dominant legal force in the development of U.S. patent law”).
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cisions, reform-minded courts have trimmed the scope of pa23
tent-eligible subject matter, made it harder to obtain (and eas24
ier to invalidate) patents based on a lack of nonobviousness,
and reinvigorated the requirement that applicants provide an
25
adequate disclosure of the invention.
Thus, it appears that raising the substantive standards of
patentability could go a long way toward solving the quality
problem. For instance, if the standards are sufficiently high, an
applicant would have a decreased likelihood of getting a patent.
This might deter some persons from filing applications altogether because a robust examination would provide a disincen26
tive for those with low-quality inventions to file. Ultimately
this would reduce the backlog, alleviate the overall strain on
Patent Office resources, and (combined with various changes
27
within the agency) empower the examiner to conduct an even
more robust examination of docketed applications. All of this

23. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that claims relating to a method of hedging risks are unpatentable).
24. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsistency with
the “expansive and flexible approach” set forth in Supreme Court precedent).
25. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (reiterating that an applicant must provide a disclosure which
enables a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of
the claimed invention without undue experimentation); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (reaffirming
well-settled law that an applicant must provide a disclosure showing possession of the full scope of the claimed subject matter).
26. “To put it crudely, if the [P]atent [O]ffice allows bad patents to issue,
this encourages people with bad applications to show up.” JAFFE & LERNER,
supra note 2, at 175. On the other hand, a robust regime does the opposite because inventors “would understand that [low-quality] applications are a waste
of time and money.” Id. It is possible that high patentability standards could
push some potential inventors into the realm of trade secret. Christopher A.
Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 780 (2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Inequitable Conduct] (citing John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty
on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 981–82 (1984)).
27. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2010–2015 STRATEGIC
PLAN 10–25 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/
USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf (describing several initiatives that will
improve examination timelines and patent quality); Press Release, U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, Recently Announced Changes to USPTO’s Examiner
Count System Go into Effect (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_08.jsp (announcing changes to the examiner
count system which will give examiners more time to review applications, rebalance incentives, and improve morale in the examining corps).
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would, at least in theory, improve the quality of issued pat28
ents.
Yet, this is only part of the story. Irrespective of the substantive standards of patentability, procedural aspects of pat29
ent examination tip the scales in favor of issuance. An appli30
cant enjoys a presumption of patentability, which means that
at the time of filing the application is rebuttably presumed to
comply with the utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure
31
requirements of the patent statute. Thus, the Patent Office
must issue a patent unless it can affirmatively prove that the
32
invention is unpatentable. The scales tip even further toward
issuance if the examiner lacks the time, materials, or incen33
tives to conduct a high-quality examination. And even though
34
the applicant owes a duty of candor to the Patent Office, no
one actually believes that everything that the applicant knows
35
about the invention ends up before the examiner. Of course,
this information deficit inevitably allows bad patents to slip
through the cracks and further contributes to the patent quali36
ty problem. The bottom line is that anyone who files a patent
37
application on anything starts off in a very good position. This
28. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 3, at 993–94 (describing the interrelationship between Patent Office resources, filing frequency, and the examination of individual applications on patent quality).
29. Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, Executive Summary, at 8 (“A plethora
of presumptions and procedures tip the scales in favor of the ultimate issuance
of a patent, once an application is filed.”).
30. A presumption is an assumption that must be drawn by the
decisionmaker in the absence of rebuttal evidence. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2491, at 305 (John H. Chadbourn ed.,
rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See sources cited supra note 12; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 21, at 23
(“[A]n examiner has no incentive to spend more time on harder cases.”); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 109 (2006) (“[T]he constraints of time, information, and evidentiary standards create a situation where ‘[t]he PTO’s evaluation of a patent [application] may be so poor or hurried as to be near meaningless.’” (quoting Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 667–68 (2002))); Carl
Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1019 (2004) (noting that patent examination is
“tilted in favor of patent applicants”).
34. See infra note 131 (discussing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012)).
35. See infra notes 129–31, 285 and accompanying text.
36. See sources cited supra note 3; sources cited infra note 285.
37. Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9 n.61 (“[P]atent applicants
are in a really great position because by filing an application they’re presump-
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strongly suggests that any plan to improve patent quality must
confront the powerful role that the presumption of patentability
38
plays in patent examination.
This Article is the first to take a hard look at the presump39
tion of patentability. Aside from comprehensively exploring its
origins, contours, proffered rationales, and continued viability,
this Article offers an alternative paradigm which better promotes the broader policy objectives of the patent system. It fills
a gap in patent scholarship and will hopefully contribute to ongoing debates over patent reform.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the presumption of patentability and current allocations of burdens of
proof and explores several legal and expediential justifications
for the paradigm. Part II argues that negative externalities
arise from the current paradigm’s pro-applicant, pro-patent bias, and that these externalities hinder patent reform efforts
and impede the patent system’s overarching goal to promote
scientific and technological progress. Finally, Part III sets forth
a new paradigm which rebalances the scales of patentability.
After describing the restructured evidentiary framework for
patent examination, this Part offers a normative analysis of the
new paradigm and explores its policy implications.

tively entitled to receive the grant.” (quoting Professor John R. Thomas));
Lemley & Sampat, supra note 2, at 192 (estimating that over 70% of applications eventually issue as patents); Dennis Crouch, USPTO Grant Rates by
Technology Center, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2010, 2:24 AM), http://www
.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/05/uspto-grant-rate-by-technology-center.html
(finding grant rates ranging from approximately 45%–80%, depending on the
technology).
38. See FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9–10, 28 (identifying the presumption of patentability as one of the failings of ex parte patent examination); Leslie, supra note 33, at 108 (“Evidentiary standards provide an additional obstacle to PTO examiners denying patent applications.”).
39. It is important to note that the presumption of patentability is not the
same as the presumption of validity which attaches to issued patents. See 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (codifying the presumption of validity); Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251–52 (2011) (reaffirming that the presumption of validity can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence).
There is a robust body of scholarship on the latter. See, e.g., Lichtman &
Lemley, supra note 18.
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE PRESUMPTION
A. THE CURRENT PARADIGM
Patent examination is an ex parte proceeding between the
40
Patent Office examiner and the applicant. Driving it are evidentiary mechanisms which include presumptions and shifting
41
burdens of proof. The current paradigm emerged from centu42
ries-old Patent Office practices, later buttressed by decisional
law from the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
43
(C.C.P.A.) and its successor court, the U.S. Court of Appeals
44
for the Federal Circuit.
The basic tenet of patent examination is that an applicant
is entitled to a patent unless the Patent Office can prove oth45
erwise. The corollary is that a patent application presumptively complies with the statutory patentability requirements
when it is filed—including utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and
46
adequate disclosure of the invention. Thus, the burden of
47
proving unpatentability rests with the Patent Office.
Working in tandem with the presumption is a burdenshifting framework which allocates the burden of proof between
the examiner and the applicant. If it appears that the invention
40. See generally ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS § 5.1 (3d ed.
2009) (explaining the process).
41. Id.
42. See infra Part I.B.1.
43. The C.C.P.A. was a five-judge Article III appellate court on the same
level as the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 1–2 (1980).
44. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A.
See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A.
decisional law as binding precedent. See South Corp. v. United States, 690
F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
45. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“If examination at
the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then
without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent.”); FTC REPORT,
supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8–9 (explaining that the Patent Office must issue a patent unless it proves unpatentability, thereby effectively creating a presumption that every requested patent should issue).
46. See FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9–10 (exploring the consensus
on this issue).
47. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445 (“[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on
review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case
of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with
evidence or argument shifts to the applicant.”); accord In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d
1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that an examiner must affirmatively
prove unpatentability).
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does not satisfy a patentability requirement, the examiner has
the initial burden of building and presenting a prima facie case
48
of unpatentability. It is established when
the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable
under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with [what is described in the patent application], and before
any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an
49
attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.

The type of proof required to make a prima facie case depends on the statutory provision at issue. But, as a general
matter, the examiner satisfies its initial burden by “adequately
explain[ing] the shortcomings [he or she] perceives so that the
50
applicant is properly notified and able to respond.” If this
51
burden is met, the burden of production shifts to the applicant
to rebut the examiner’s contention of unpatentability with per52
suasive argument or proof. When the applicant submits rebut53
tal evidence, the examiner must “start over” and “consider all
54
of the evidence anew.” The burden of production may continue
to shift as each side presents new evidence; however, the exam55
iner carries the ultimate burden of persuasion. The examiner
56
must determine patentability based on the entire record, with

48. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (noting that the Patent Office must establish a prima facie case before
any burden shifting occurs).
49. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2012).
50. Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
51. It is worth noting that if the examiner fails to establish a prima facie
case, the applicant need not provide any rebuttal evidence and is entitled to a
patent barring other grounds for unpatentability. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688,
710 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (citing In re Seigneurin, 474 F.2d 1020, 1023
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (explaining that since no prima facie was established, “[t]hat
concludes the matter”)).
52. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445.
53. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A 1976)).
54. Id.
55. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449; see In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) (articulating the rule that the Patent Office
carries the burden of persuasion in showing why an applicant should not receive a patent).
56. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.05 (8th ed., rev. 8,
2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (instructing the examiner to evaluate enablement
based on the weight of all the evidence, including any new evidence supplied
by the applicant to rebut the prima facie case); id. § 716.01(d) (giving a similar
instruction for the nonobviousness analysis).
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a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof. Absent any other grounds of unpatentability, the Patent Office
58
must issue the patent.
To illustrate the current framework, consider the following
hypothetical. Suppose an inventor develops a method for mak59
ing bread with the highly-publicized fat substitute Olestra.
60
Since Olestra is not available for retail purchase, the inventor
develops the method by replacing the fat and a portion of the
flour in a white bread recipe with pulverized Lay’s Light Origi61
nal Potato Chips (which are fried in Olestra). When the modified recipe yields an excellent loaf, the inventor prepares a pat62
ent application.
Although the application’s written
63
description only discloses a single working example (the modified white bread recipe), it states that the amount of potato
64
chips and flour needed in other embodiments of the invention
57. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“[P]reponderance of the evidence is the standard that must be met by
the PTO in making rejections.”).
58. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; Michel, supra note 22, at 1249 (“If the
claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled to a patent (because
[§ 102 of] the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as patentability can
be determined.”).
59. See, e.g., Marian Burros, U.S. Approves Fake Fat for Use in Snack
Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A12; Dana Canedy, Fat-Free Fanfare as
Procter Starts Shipping Out Olestra, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at D2. Olestra
is an indigestible, fat-like molecule derived from sugar and vegetable oil accidentally discovered by Procter & Gamble researchers around 1968. Vivienne
V. Yankah & Casimir C. Akoh, Zero Energy Fat-Like Substances: Olestra, in
STRUCTURED AND MODIFIED LIPIDS 511, 514–15 (Frank D. Gunstone ed.,
2001). It is a zero-calorie, non-fat oil, butter, and shortening substitute which
tastes like fat. Id.; see also DAVID E. NEWTON, FOOD CHEMISTRY 82 (2007).
60. Currently Olestra is only available as an ingredient in certain snack
foods. See Olestra, 21 C.F.R. § 172.867(c) (2012).
61. See Lay’s Light Original Potato Chips, FRITO LAY, http://www.fritolay
.com/our-snacks/lays-light-original.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (listing
ingredients).
62. For examples of patents directed to methods of making bread with fat
substitutes, see Process for Producing a Fat-Substitute Bakery Dough and the
Fat Substitute Bakery Products, U.S. Patent No. 5,344,663 (filed Jan. 15,
1992); Methods of Making Bread Products Without Shortenings and/or Oils,
U.S. Patent No. 5,510,136 (filed Oct. 21, 1994).
63. The written description is the part of the patent (or patent application) that completely describes the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The
specification shall contain a written description . . . . It shall conclude with one
or more claims . . . .”). Although I will not do so in this Article, it is worth noting that the terms “written description” and “specification” are often used interchangeably (and mistakenly) in patent law. F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 155 n.4 (5th ed. 2011).
64. An “embodiment” is a concrete, physical form of an invention de-
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can be determined empirically to produce various types of leavened and unleavened bread items such as other white breads,
whole wheat breads, rye breads, buns, cinnamon rolls, bread65
sticks, pizza crusts, flour tortillas, and flatbreads. The application concludes with the following claim:
A method of making bread products without using shortenings
and/or oils comprising: substituting pulverized Olestra-based potato
chips for said shortenings and/or oils in a bread dough which is baked
66
to make bread products.

In patent law, this is considered a “broad” claim because the
language does not limit the invention to any specific type of
67
bread.
An examiner with expertise in the field reads the application and checks it for compliance with the statutory patentabil68
ity requirements. Focusing on enablement, the question is
69
whether a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA)
could make and use the invention as broadly as it is claimed at
70
the time of filing without undue experimentation. Analyzing
enablement is a fact-intensive inquiry which includes constru71
ing the claim to determine its scope, evaluating the teaching
scribed in a patent application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (5th
ed. 2011).
65. Cf. ’663 Patent col.15; ’136 Patent col.3.
66. Cf. Claim 1, ’136 Patent col.6 (making analogous claim that waxy barley flour can be substituted for shortenings and oils in bread dough).
67. See MIELE, supra note 11, at 98 (explaining an applicant’s incentive
“to obtain very broad claims for which a colorable argument can be made for
patentability”).
68. See supra note 3 (reciting the conditions for patentability).
69. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the
reasonably prudent person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”). Factors relevant to
constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the educational
level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the
art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innovations are made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (listing the factors).
70. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Although the term
“undue experimentation” does not appear in the statute, “it is well established
that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make
and use the invention without undue experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
71. See MPEP, supra note 56, § 2164.04 (instructing examiners to construe claims before analyzing enablement). Claim construction includes defining terms that are ambiguous or are not well known in the art, while simulta-
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provided in the written description, and determining the
72
PHOSITA’s knowledge and level of skill.
The examiner rejects the claim as prima facie
73
74
nonenabled. Relying on a reference which describes the
75
“complex” nature of baking, the examiner concludes that a
PHOSITA could not read the applicant’s description about the
single embodiment actually made (white bread) and extrapolate from it how to make without difficulty other embodiments
76
encompassed by the claim (the universe of bread products).
And since the reference explains that bread quality is highly
dependent on the identity and quantity of flour, fat, and other

neously giving the claims the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the written description. In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
72. Cf. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]ith respect to enablement[,] the relevant
inquiry lies in the relationship between the [written description], the claims,
and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.”). The Federal Circuit
has articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors—the so-called Wands factors—
for determining undue experimentation, including (1) the amount of direction
or guidance presented in the disclosure; (2) the existence of working examples;
(3) the nature of the invention; (4) the predictability or unpredictability of the
art; (5) the PHOSITA’s relative skill; (6) the state of the prior art; (7) the
breadth of the claims; and (8) the quantity of experimentation necessary to
practice the claimed invention. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. Certain factors may
be more relevant than others for a particular invention. See Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the
Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
73. To establish a prima facie case of nonenablement, the examiner must
set forth a reasonable explanation as to why he or she believes that the scope
of protection sought in that claim is not adequately enabled by the description
of the invention provided in the written description. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561–
62.
74. The examiner must support rejections with references. In re
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d
1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that the Patent Office must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement rejection, rather than conclusory statements as to the level of ordinary skill in the art).
75. “Bread quality is determined by the complex interactions of the raw
materials, their qualities and quantities used in the recipe and the dough processing method.” Stanley P. Cauvain, Breadmaking: An Overview, in BREAD
MAKING: IMPROVING QUALITY 8, 14 (Stanley P. Cauvain ed., 2003).
76. Whether a single working example is sufficient to enable a broad
claim is a quintessential enablement issue. Compare In re Vickers, 141 F.2d
522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (explaining that an inventor “is generally allowed
[broad] claims, when the art permits, which cover more than the specific embodiment shown” (emphasis omitted)), with Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a disclosure
that enabled one embodiment was insufficient to support a claim that covered
additional embodiments).
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77

ingredients, the examiner concludes that a PHOSITA would
have to engage in undue experimentation to practice the full
78
scope of the claimed invention.
The applicant responds with three rebuttal arguments.
First, the applicant points out that the claim makes no mention
of the quality of the bread product; thus any rejection relating
79
to bread quality is improper. Second, the applicant reminds
the examiner that to satisfy enablement, one can rely on what
is taught in the patent document as well as what the PHOSITA
already knows or could figure out through routine experimen80
tation. Third and relatedly, the applicant argues that experimentation that is laborious, tedious, time-consuming, or requires the manipulation of multiple variables is not necessarily
undue—particularly if it is routine or the nature of the art so
81
82
demands. The applicant bolsters this argument with a book
77. Cauvain, supra note 75, at 14–17.
78. See supra notes 70, 72 (describing the “without undue experimentation” requirement for enablement).
79. See Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that enablement only focuses on
what is actually claimed, but noting in dicta that an invention’s imperfect or
crude operation does not defeat patentability).
80. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“That is
not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe how to make
and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for the [PHOSITA’s]
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.”). But see
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he rule that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art
is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure . . . . To satisfy the plain language of § 112 para. 1, [an applicant] cannot simply rely on the knowledge of [the PHOSITA] to serve as a substitute for
the missing information in the specification.” (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted)).
81. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing In re Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804, 807 (Bd. App. 1982) (“The test is not merely
quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if
it is merely routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable
amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which the experimentation
should proceed . . . .”)); see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d
1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that repeating experiments to obtain success is not undue experimentation); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502–03
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (explaining that since limiting claim scope to embodiments actually made has downsides for patent policy, the unfortunate consequence is
that a PHOSITA must engage in time-sensitive experimentation to figure out
what works).
82. PAULA FIGONI, HOW BAKING WORKS: EXPLORING THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF BAKING SCIENCE 480–81 (3d ed. 2011).

2013]

PRESUMPTION OF PATENTABILITY

1003

which teaches that using fat replacers in baking requires trial
83
and error—a permissible type of experimentation.
Upon reconsideration, after weighing all of the evidence,
the examiner acquiesces and withdraws the enablement rejec84
tion. Absent other grounds for unpatentability, the application
85
proceeds to patent issuance.
B. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
1. Patent Office Practices
History reveals that placing the ultimate burden of proving
unpatentability with the examiner has been an established
practice in the Patent Office for over a century. The principal
cited authorities are a pair of old Patent Office rules and an
intraoffice appeal from 1900 involving a paper fastener and a
86
recalcitrant examiner. The first rule required the examiner to
87
state the grounds for rejection with specificity. The second
rule required the examiner to reconsider patentability if the
applicant challenged a rejection, giving due care to the appli88
89
cant’s arguments. In the appeal, Ex parte Garms, the examiner had rejected a claim for a paper fastener for a lack of novelty based on the examiner’s personal knowledge of the subject
matter. The second rule mentioned above required the examiner to support a personal-knowledge rejection with an affidavit

83. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (citing Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1916)
(“leaving something to the skill [of the PHOSITA]” was sufficient for patentability because it was impossible for the patentee to disclose the precise, most
successful treatment for each embodiment)).
84. Once the applicant provides rebuttal evidence, the examiner “must
then weigh all the evidence[,] including the specification and any new evidence
supplied by [the] applicant with the evidence and/or sound scientific reasoning
previously presented in the [initial] rejection and decide whether the claimed
invention is enabled.” MPEP, supra note 56, § 2164.05.
85. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
86. See Leon Zitver, The Resolution of Doubt, 28 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 389,
397–98 (1946) (exploring the history of placing the burden of proving
unpatentability on the examiner).
87. See E. J. STODDARD, ANNOTATED RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES PATENT OFFICE 226 (1920) (Rule 65, which explained that “[t]he reasons for the rejection will be fully and precisely stated”); id. at 231 (Rule 66,
which required the examiner to explain the pertinency of an asserted reference).
88. See id. at 226 (Rule 65).
89. 93 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 190 (1900).
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90

(which the applicant could attack). The examiner refused to
furnish an affidavit despite the rule and the applicant’s repeat91
ed requests. On appeal, the Commissioner of Patents scolded
the examiner for his stubbornness and granted a petition to
92
compel him to comply with the rule.
Reliance on these authorities as support for the allocation
93
of the burden of persuasion has been criticized. For instance,
one commentator has argued that the authorities appear to
have more to do with the (shifting) burden of producing evidence:
The ultimate burden of proof is borne by the same party throughout a proceeding and is fixed by substantive law. The duty of producing evidence, that is, of going forward with the case, is a procedural
matter and shifts back and forth between the parties as the proceedings advance. [The cited authorities] deal only with [this] burden. The
ultimate burden of proof is a matter beyond the scope of the Patent
Office Rules of Practice, which are procedural and not substantive in
94
nature.

Nevertheless, these authorities anchor the “long-established
custom” of placing the burden of proving unpatentability on the
95
examiner.
Buttressing the presumption of patentability is the now96
defunct “rule of doubt.” It required that all doubts as to pat97
entability were to be resolved in favor of the applicant. Attorney General William Wirt first articulated the rule in 1827: “In
every case of doubt, however, it would seem to be more congen90. When reference is made to facts within the personal knowledge of
an employee of the office, the data shall be as specific as possible, and
the reference must be supported, when called for, by the affidavit of
such employee; such affidavit shall be subject to contradiction, explanation, or corroboration by the affidavits of the applicant and other
persons.
STODDARD, supra note 87, at 232 (Rule 66 in pertinent part).
91. Garms, 93 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 190.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Zitver, supra note 86, at 398.
94. Id. (citing WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, §§ 2485–2489).
95. V. I. Richard, Ex Parte Appeals to the Board of Appeals. Outline of
Practice, 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 303, 303 (1943).
96. In re Hofstetter, 362 F.2d 293, 297–99 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (tracing the origins and evolution of the rule), vacated, Brenner v. Hofstetter, 389 U.S. 5, 5
(1967).
97. Id. For additional commentary, see W. Becker & S. Heller, The “Rule
of Doubt”—In re Hofstetter, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607 passim (1967); Edwin
M. Thomas, Resolving Doubts Regarding Patentability, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
831 (1938); Zitver, supra note 86, at 397–98; Benjamin F. Lambert, Student
Paper, Patentability—Rule of Doubt, 12 IDEA 703 passim (1968).
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ial with the policy of the law to afford the citizen an opportuni98
ty of trying the validity of his right by issuing the patent.”
The rule had become firmly entrenched within the agency
99
by the end of the nineteenth century and was widely applied
100
by the courts hearing ex parte appeals from the Patent Office
101
102
for most of the twentieth century. In In re Hofstetter, the
103
C.C.P.A. proffered “very sound policy reasons” for the rule:
98. 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 52, 52 (1827).
99. This occurred after several twists and turns. Compare Ex parte Coes,
6 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1, 1 (1874) (explaining that giving the applicant the
benefit of the doubt in all cases can result in the issuance of “frivolous patents”), with Ex parte Fanshawe, 57 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1127, 1128 (1891)
(noting that when a comparison of the claimed device and the prior art raises
a doubt as to patentability, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the applicant).
100. Beginning in 1927, an applicant whose claims had been rejected by
the examiner could appeal to an intraoffice tribunal known as the Board of
Appeals. See P. J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (Part II), 22 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 920, 944–45 (1940). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction over ex parte appeals from
the Patent Office until 1929. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 48, 16 Stat.
198, 205 (repealed 1929). At that time, jurisdiction was transferred to the
C.C.P.A. See Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, §§ 1–2, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475–76;
RICH, supra note 43, at 1. Alternatively, a disgruntled applicant who wanted
to introduce additional evidence could file a civil action with the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2006). Prior to
the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, appeals in civil actions remained
with the D.C. Circuit. See Federico, supra, at 947. In sum, three appellate
courts—the D.C. Circuit, C.C.P.A., and Federal Circuit—have heard appeals
from the Patent Office.
101. See, e.g., In re Eastwood, 33 App. D.C. 291, 299–300 (D.C. Cir. 1909)
(“[When it is] a doubtful question whether appellant’s discovery is not patentable . . . it has been the policy of this court to resolve the doubt in favor of the
applicant.” (citing In re Thompson, 26 App. D.C. 419, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1906)); In
re Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 690–91 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (explaining that when there is
a doubt as to the factual basis supporting the Board of Appeals’ conclusion of
obviousness, “the doubt should be resolved in favor of the applicant”); In re
Hummer, 241 F.2d 742, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (“We think any doubt on the question of patentability should be resolved in favor of the applicant.”); In re
Uddenborg, 39 F.2d 710, 713 (C.C.P.A.1930) (“[T]he appellant has produced a
new device which accomplishes a new and useful purpose and . . . the spirit
and purpose of the patent law will be subserved by the grant of a patent to
him. If there is any doubt about it, he should have the benefit of it.” (citations
omitted)). The C.C.P.A. explained how the rule worked when applied in appellate proceedings:
It was that if the court, after consideration of everything made available to it by the record, was left in doubt about patentability (on any
ground), such ultimate doubt should be “resolved” in favor of the applicant for patent. To state it another way, the applicant was “given
the benefit” of the doubt.
In re Naber, 503 F.2d 1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (per curiam).
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Several of the factors properly taken into account in determining
patentability, specially unobviousness and utility, are often not
known at the time when the application is being prosecuted in the
Patent Office but are developed later, perhaps even after the patent is
issued. It therefore is proper that doubt should be resolved in favor of
applicants so that they shall not be denied patents which later events
may show them entitled to. Among such events, which may even have
to await patenting, are commercial success, unexpected utility, dis104
placement of competing devices, etc.

Thus, the rationale behind the rule “was that patents are often
granted with a view toward leaving open, to be decided by the
courts, questions which the Patent Office does not deem it
proper to adjudicate against the applicant by withholding the
105
patent.” Though the C.C.P.A. believed that the rule “ma[de]
106
for a better and fairer . . . patent system,” the Supreme Court
107
ultimately rejected this reasoning.
While the rule of doubt was ultimately abandoned by the
108
109
Patent Office and the courts, the ultimate burden of prov110
ing unpatentability with the examiner has remained intact.
102. 362 F.2d 293 (C.C.P.A. 1966), vacated, Brenner v. Hofstetter, 389 U.S.
5 (1967).
103. Id. at 298.
104. Id. (emphasis added); cf. 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 3:17 (4th ed. 2012) (contending that “the USPTO’s substantive determination of patentability is simply an initial determination of whether the appliedfor patent right appears likely to survive challenge before the courts” and that
the agency’s determination “is less complete than the judicial determination of
validity” (citing U.S. Patent Office, Study No. 25: Court Decisions as Guides to
Patent Office Policy and Performance, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D. SESS., STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS (Comm. Print 1960) (written primarily by George C.
Roeming))).
105. Lambert, supra note 97, at 706–07. The D.C. Circuit proffered a similar rationale:
In case of ordinary doubt, the policy of the patent system, as customarily maintained in the Patent Office, has been to give the applicant the benefit thereof, because no absolute right of property is conferred by the grant of a patent. The patentee is merely put in a
position to assert his prima facie right against infringers who may, in
their defense, raise the question of the validity of the patent, and
have the same finally adjudicated in the light of a full presentation
and consideration of all the evidence attainable in respect of anticipation, prior knowledge, use, and the like.
Thompson, 26 App. D.C. at 425 (internal citation omitted).
106. Hofstetter, 362 F.2d at 298.
107. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“[I]t must be
remembered that the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is—for all practical purposes—to debilitate the patent system.”).
108. Edward J. Brenner, Comm’r of Patents, Patent Office Activities Dur-
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2. Statutory Considerations
Another justification for the presumption of patentability
comes from language in the Patent Act. Those who espouse this
view point specifically to the introductory clause of § 102 of Title 35 of the U.S. Code which states that “a person shall be en111
titled to a patent unless . . . .”
Since § 102 deals with novelty, on its face the language
seems to create a presumption of novelty. The C.C.P.A. recog112
nized as much in In re Wilder. Yet the Federal Circuit has
construed the language in that provision much more broadly to
compel the Patent Office to demonstrate unpatentability for
113
any of the patentability criteria. One possible justification for
ing Fiscal Year 1966—Outlook for Fiscal Year 1967, Address Delivered to Patent Office Professional Staff (July 28, 1966), in 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 475, 476
(1966) (“In order to further clarify Office policy . . . I wish to state here that it
is our judgment that any application covering an invention of doubtful patentability should not be allowed, unless and until such doubt is removed in the
course of examination and prosecution . . . .” ).
109. See In re Andersen, 743 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he premise that doubts as to patentability should be resolved in favor of a patent applicant is now defunct.” (citation omitted)), overruled in part by In re Etter,
756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Reynolds v. Aghnides, 356 F.2d 367, 367 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (per curium) (“[D]oubt (as to patentability) is to be resolved, not in
favor of the applicant, but in favor of the correctness of administrative action.”
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Abbott v. Coe, 109 F.2d 449,
451 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“While the judgment of Patent Office officials is not absolutely binding on the courts, it is entitled to great weight, and is to be overcome by clear proof of mistake.” (citation omitted)); id. at 451 (noting further
“[t]he presumption that the Patent Office is right”); In re Naber, 503 F.2d
1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (per curiam) (explaining that doubts as to obviousness in the case were resolved by the examination of facts and not “by any arbitrary rule”); In re Mixon, 470 F.2d 1374, 1378–79 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (Worley,
C.J., supplemental opinion) (inviting the court to abandon the rule for the sake
of judicial uniformity, certainty, and lack of statutory support).
110. See supra Part I.A.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
112. 429 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[T]he statute provides for what
may be said to be a presumption of novelty in the language of section 102 ‘a
person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .’” (emphasis added)).
113. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8. In other words, as far as the
presumption is concerned, the courts make no distinction between novelty and
the other substantive requirements for patentability. See Tafas v. Doll, 559
F.3d 1345, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court’s reliance on
§ 102 that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless” combined with Federal Circuit precedent places the initial burden of proving unpatentability on
the Patent Office (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)));
FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8 n.56 (noting the breadth of the presumption as applied to all patentability criteria even though “the language relied
upon, that a ‘person shall be entitled to a patent unless’ appears in § 102 of the
Patent Act, dealing with novelty but not in § 103 (dealing with
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this one-size-fits-all interpretation is that it would be unworkable for applicants, the Patent Office, and the courts to handle
different and unique presumptions and proof burdens for each
114
of the individual statutory patentability requirements.
The Federal Circuit also points to the introductory clause
of § 102 as support for the locution of the initial burden of producing evidence (of unpatentability) and the burden of persua115
sion. As former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel once
explained:
If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled to a
patent (because the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as
patentability can be determined. Moreover, the burden of proof is on
the PTO to show unpatentability, not on the applicant to establish patentability, and it remains on the PTO even if [it] has made a prima
116
facie case.

This expansive interpretation of the clause not only places an
117
applicant in a very good position, but also impedes attempts
118
“to weed out unwarranted patents.”
The details of the clause’s drafting history also suggest
that the Federal Circuit is reading too much into it. The 1952
Patent Act was co-drafted by then-Examiner-in-Chief and Patent Office Board of Appeals member Pasquale J. (Pat) Federi119
co and then-patent attorney and future C.C.P.A. and Federal
120
Circuit Judge Giles Sutherland Rich. In a first-person account of the drafting of the clause, Judge Rich explained:
nonobviousness) or § 112 (dealing with enablement, written description, best
mode and utility)”).
114. Thus, the Patent Office and the courts make no practical distinction
between the different patentability criteria. But see Aristocrat Techs. Austl.
PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 662 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that
while utility, patent-eligible subject matter, novelty, and nonobviousness are
“conditions of patentability,” the disclosure requirements of § 112 are “merely
requirements for obtaining a valid patent”).
115. Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, Executive Summary, at 9 (“[T]he
courts have interpreted the patent statute to require the PTO to grant a patent application unless the PTO can establish that the claimed invention does
not meet one or more of the patentability criteria. Once an application is filed,
the claimed invention is effectively presumed to warrant a patent unless the
PTO can prove otherwise.”).
116. Michel, supra note 22, at 1249 (second emphasis added).
117. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
118. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 1, at 31–32.
119. For a short biographical sketch, see Giles S. Rich, P. J. (Pat) Federico
and His Works, 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 3, 3–11 (1982).
120. See Judge Giles S. Rich, C.C.P.A., Congressional Intent—Or, Who
Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, Lecture Presented at the First Annual Institute on Patent Law (Mar. 21–22, 1963), in PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EX-
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There is an interesting thing about the introductory clause of [section] 102. Pat originally wrote “An invention shall not be considered
new or capable of being patented if . . . .” As the drafting progressed,
taking a tip from the Lanham Act, section 2, we turned it into the positive statement “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .” as
it reads today. We just felt like slapping down the detractors of the
121
patent system, many of whom were in the judiciary.

Given the drafters’ motivation for the word choices, an expansive interpretation of the clause’s language seems even more
tenuous.
C. EXPEDIENTIAL ARGUMENTS
Since it is unlikely that Congress will tinker with the pat122
ent statutes any time in the foreseeable future, any efforts to
change the presumption of patentability or the current allocations of the burdens of proof will likely come from the Federal
123
Circuit. Though the court points to § 102 as primary support
for its stance, it is perhaps buttressed by one or more expediential considerations.
1. Information Gathering
Patent procurement imposes a substantial information
burden on the Patent Office. As Professor Lee Petherbridge has
explained:
The Patent Office has three primary information functions. Those
functions include collection, use, and recordation. The Patent Office
performs its “collection” function by (1) collecting information concerning the boundaries of the property for which an applicant seeks
the right to exclude and (2) collecting information concerning the prior art [or other patently relevant factors]. The Patent Office performs

61, 67–69 (1963) (discussing the composition of the Drafting
Committee for the bill that became the 1952 Patent Act).
121. Janice M. Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 895, 902
(1999) (quoting an e-mail from Judge Giles S. Rich to Janice Mueller, Assoc.
Professor, The John Marshall Law School (Aug. 8, 1997)). The original language appeared in the first bill introduced in Congress relating to what became the Patent Act of 1952, H.R. 9133, in 1950. The text was changed in a
subsequent bill, H.R. 3760, introduced in the next congressional session. Compare H.R. 9133, 81st Cong. § 102 (2d Sess. 1950) (“An invention shall not be
considered new or capable of being patented if . . . .”), with H.R. 3760, 82d
Cong. § 102 (1st Sess. 1951) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .”).
122. In 2011, Congress made the most sweeping reform to U.S. patent law
since 1952. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011).
123. See sources cited supra note 22 (discussing the importance of the Federal Circuit in the development of U.S. patent law).
PLOITATION
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its “use” function by engaging in the substantive decision making that
attends the statutory requirements for patentability. The Patent Office performs its “recordation” function by (1) recording information
useful for defining the boundaries of the property and (2) recording
information that shows how the boundaries of the patented property
make that property completely and patentably distinct from property
124
already in the public domain.

The collection and use functions in particular can be very in125
formation-demanding inquiries.
For example, the Federal
Circuit has articulated eight factors which can be relevant in
determining whether an applicant’s disclosure satisfies the enablement requirement; including the state of the prior art and
126
the PHOSITA’s knowledge and level of skill. Nonobviousness
is also a highly fact-intensive inquiry which (like enablement)
depends on the nature of the technology and the PHOSITA’s
127
knowledge and abilities. The information demands of these
multifactor inquiries intensify as the subject matter becomes
128
more complex.
Solving the information-gathering problem is not easy. For
instance, providing examiners with more time to work on complex cases would at best provide an incomplete solution. As Professor Joseph Scott Miller has argued:
[E]ven if the Patent Office were to invest far more in reviewing applications, its review would still suffer from a basic knowledge deficit
compared to that which well-informed inventors and their competitors possess. Unlike these parties, the Patent Office is not actually

124. Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 189 (2006).
125. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 62–
74 (2010) (exploring the information-demanding nature of the patentability
requirements and the associated costs and externalities).
126. See discussion supra note 72 (discussing the test for enablement set
forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
127. Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An
Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 929
(2007). The nonobviousness requirement, embodied in § 103(a) of the Patent
Act, denies patents for trivial extensions of what is already in the public domain. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–17 (2007) (exploring the wisdom of denying patents
for trivial inventions). In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
Supreme Court articulated the basic framework for determining
nonobviousness. It is a question of law based on the following pertinent underlying facts: (1) the scope and content of the relevant prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention; (3) the PHOSITA’s level of skill; and (4) secondary considerations which provide objective proof of
nonobviousness, such as commercial success or that the invention fulfilled a
long-felt but unsolved need. Id. at 17.
128. See Lee, supra note 125, at 67.
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innovating on the leading edge of technological change in a given
129
field.

Applicants can do much to improve the information deficit because they “know better than [the Patent Office or] anyone else
130
precisely what it is they have developed or invented . . . .” The
131
challenge is to get this knowledge into the examiner’s hands.
Though it is well known that the Patent Office has prob132
lems gathering adequate information, so too does the Federal
133
Circuit. When the court adjudicates an ex parte appeal from
the Patent Office, it receives a record which is limited to the
prosecution history and proceedings before the Patent Office’s
134
Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Unlike appeals from district
courts, the Federal Circuit is precluded from the benefit of ad135
ditional evidence or factfinding. Combined with the fact that
129. Miller, supra note 2, at 733.
130. Id. at 734.
131. The Patent Office seeks to combat its information deficit by imposing
upon applicants “a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office,
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that
individual to be material to patentability . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012).
132. See, e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 124, at 189; sources cited supra
note 2; sources cited infra note 283.
133. See Petherbridge, supra note 124, at 189 (explaining that while the
Patent Office can collect information from a wide array of sources, “the other
participants in the patent system, i.e., competitors, courts, and the public-atlarge cannot”).
134. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2006) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the
record before the Patent and Trademark Office.”); see also In re Gartside, 203
F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In appeals from the Board, we have before
us a comprehensive record that contains the arguments and evidence presented by the parties . . . . That record, when before us, is closed . . . . [And] thus
dictates the parameters of our review.”); In re Varga, 511 F.2d 1175, 1178
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (explaining that § 144 limits the appeal to “evidence produced
before the Patent Office”). Before passage of the America Invents Act in 2011,
the tribunal was known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 290
(2011) (eliminating interference proceedings).
135. See sources cited supra note 134; In re Jones, 10 F. App’x 822, 828–29
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“This court is not a fact-finder in the first instance . . . . [O]ur
review is limited to the record before the Board.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 144;
Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316)). To further explain the procedural aspects of patent appeals, an applicant whose claims have been twice rejected by the examiner can appeal to an intraoffice tribunal (Board) which, among other things,
reviews adverse decisions of examiners. See supra notes 100, 134; 35 U.S.C.
§§ 6(b), 134(a) (2006); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, §§ 3, 7. The Board
can affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37
C.F.R. § 1.197 (2012). An applicant dissatisfied with a Board decision can appeal to the Federal Circuit or file a civil action against the Director in federal
district court. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2006) (placing venue with the U.S.
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the Patent Office all-too-often lacks adequate information about
136
the invention at the time of examination, it stands to reason
that the Federal Circuit could face an information deficit when
137
adjudicating an ex parte appeal.
Viewed in this light, the current paradigm begins to make
sense. The court imposes presumptions and allocates burdens
of proof in such a way as to maximize the quantity of information generated during examination to hopefully ensure the
138
production of a robust record for appeal. In deciding whether
the applicant or the Patent Office is in the best position to provide this information, the court seems to believe—and perhaps
not unreasonably so (even if not rightly)—that requiring the
Patent Office to both go first by building a prima facie case of
unpatentability and to carry the burden of persuasion on the
139
patentability issue is the best way to achieve this goal.
2. Concerns About Arbitrariness and Competence
To the extent that the Federal Circuit views itself as the
140
steward of the patent system and as overseer of the Patent
District Court for the District of Columbia); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
§ 9(a) (amending § 145 by moving venue to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia). In the latter, the parties may submit additional
evidence or argue the previous evidence afresh. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d
1320, 1330–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (reaffirming that the applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence is the hallmark of a § 145 action and rejecting
the Patent Office’s contention that “the applicant is only allowed to introduce
new evidence that ‘the applicant could not reasonably have provided to the
agency in the first instance’” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700–
01 (2012).
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. Petherbridge, supra note 124, at 189 (“Because the record becomes
fixed . . . how well the Patent Office performs its information functions is a
rate limiting step in the patent system and thus allocates information costs to
other participants.”).
138. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice,
86 IND. L.J. 779, 817–18 (2011) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s use of presumptions in the infringement context serves a “information-forcing” function).
139. Put simply, the court views the status quo as the most pragmatic way
to get information in the ex parte appeal context. See Lee, supra note 125, at
77–79 (arguing that in contrast to district court judges who can conduct complicated factfinding and the Supreme Court which can take a “big picture” approach to patent cases, the Federal Circuit is primarily concerned with “everyday practicality”).
140. See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1747, 1797 (2011) (“[T]he Federal Circuit is in many ways the primary steward of substantive patent law.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law,

2013]

PRESUMPTION OF PATENTABILITY

1013

141

Office, the court might have an interest in ensuring that the
Patent Office is not making arbitrary patentability determinations. This explains, at least in part, why the Federal Circuit
142
and its predecessor have insisted that the Patent Office support determinations of unpatentability with factual evidence or
143
sound technical reasoning
rather than with conclusory
144
145
statements or subjective judgments.
Thus, it could be argued that the current proof paradigm
exists simply to ensure fairness in patent examination. A different view is that it reflects skepticism about the Patent Of146
fice’s technical competence.
At least for enablement and
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007), http://www
.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/106/eisenberg.pdf (explaining that the Supreme Court “is free to grant certiorari [in patent cases] more often if it is unhappy with the Federal Circuit’s stewardship”).
141. Cf. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 892 (2010) (referring to the C.C.P.A.’s “role as
overseer of the Patent Office”); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1975 (2009) (“In addition to
getting more autonomy from executive branch oversight, the PTO has also
been trying to get more deferential review of its decisions from the Federal
Circuit.”); id. at 1982 (“[T]he framework used by the Federal Circuit to determine whether future PTO-proposed rules are procedural or substantive continues to allow the court to oversee the PTO.”).
142. See supra note 43 (discussing the C.C.P.A.).
143. See, e.g., In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting
that specific technical reasons are required to challenge enablement); accord
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying Marzocchi to the
utility context). The Federal Circuit has held that the Administrative Procedure Act, which governs Patent Office tribunals and the related judicial review, requires the agency to provide a record with full, reasoned, and wellarticulated explanations for its conclusions. In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)).
144. See In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that
the Patent Office must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement rejection, rather than conclusory statements regarding the PHOSITA’s level of
skill); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead,
there must be some articulated reasoning with some rationale underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” (quoted in KSR Int’l v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
145. For examples of courts chastising the Patent Office for subjective
judgments, see In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining
that the Patent Office should not attempt to ascertain the scientific explanations because the agency “is not a guarantor of scientific theory”), and In re
Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (rejecting the Patent Office’s contention that an invention must possess “some definite advantage over the prior
art” in order to be patentable) (emphasis omitted)).
146. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?
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nonobviousness—the patentability requirements involving
147
highly fact-intensive inquiries—it is probably a bit of both. To
see how, consider the helpful discussion that Professors Robert
Merges and Richard Nelson provide in the case of enablement:
If the patent examiner can point to something in the prior art that indicates that some embodiments of the claimed invention will be impossible to make without more information than the inventor has disclosed, then the application may be rejected. But if the examiner
cannot point to such an indication in the prior art, [P]atent [O]ffice
policy dictates that even very broad claims may be allowed. This
means that claims . . . often are allowed to cover ground that examiners believe, but cannot prove, is well beyond the area actually explored and disclosed by the inventor. The rule puts the burden of disproving enablement on the examiner. The rationale is that any other
rule would leave claim scope too much in the hands of individual ex148
aminers and their technological forecasting abilities.

If claim scope is to be narrowed, that task “is left to the courts
149
in particular infringement suits.”
II. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
A. ON PATENT REFORM
As noted earlier, certain practices and procedures at the
Patent Office have contributed to the issuance of low-quality
150
151
patents. The agency’s leadership recognizes the problem
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J.
269, 299 (2007) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no
deference whatsoever to PTO legal interpretations.”); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1449–50 (1995)
(raising the issue of technical competence and noting concerns from the members of the patent bar “who believe that the PTO could be more efficient and
technologically savvy”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035,
1068–69 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should be more willing to defer to the Patent Office’s technical expertise).
147. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. It is important to note
that enablement and nonobviousness as legal questions are reviewed de novo
by the court. See In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (enablement); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (nonobviousness).
148. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848–49 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
149. Id. at 849 (emphasis added); cf. supra notes 102–05 and accompanying
text (exploring the view that the Patent Office’s examination is just an initial
determination of issues that must be resolved by the courts).
150. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Enhancement in the Quality of
Patents, 74 Fed. Reg. 65,093, 65,093–100 (Dec. 9, 2009); David Kappos, Talk-

2013]

PRESUMPTION OF PATENTABILITY

1015

and has taken steps to provide the examining corps with the
time, tools, and incentives necessary to help ensure a more ro152
bust examination of patent applications.
It is hoped that
these measures will reduce the number of questionable patents
153
that issue.
But the presumption of patentability and current allocations of burdens of proof pose major obstacles to achieving this
goal. Even if examiners are better equipped and more incentivized to do their job, compelling them to affirmatively prove
unpatentability still gives applicants the upper hand in the
process. As explained in the Federal Trade Commission’s 2003
report on the patent system and legislative and administrative
changes that could improve it:
The ex parte nature of the [examination] proceeding leaves the examiner on his or her own to evaluate and challenge applicants’ assertions. Because the courts have placed the burden on the PTO to
demonstrate grounds for rejecting a patent, rather than on the applicant to demonstrate that it meets the statutory criteria, difficulties in
154
assembling responsive evidence work in favor of patent applicants.

This predilection toward patent issuance counteracts efforts to
both improve patent examination quality and to reduce overall
155
application volume (and hence, the application backlog) by
156
deterring filings for frivolous inventions.
B. ON INNOVATION AND PATENT POLICY
The patent system’s overarching goal is to promote scien157
tific and technological progress. In theory, each of the indiing Quality, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: DAVID KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010,
9:19 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/talking_quality.
152. See sources cited supra note 27.
153. See sources cited supra notes 27, 151.
154. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 8; see also id. Executive Summary, at 8 (“A plethora of presumptions and procedures tip the scales in favor
of the ultimate issuance of a patent, once an application is filed.”).
155. See supra note 17.
156. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing how a robust examination regime can discourage frivolous filings, whereas a lax regime has
the opposite effect).
157. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that
Intellectual Property Clause empowered Congress to pass “a series of patent
laws . . . as a means of encouraging innovation”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 223–24 (2003) (noting that the constitutional command for “limited
times” is the “ultimate purpose” of the patent system); Motion Picture Patents
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vidual statutory requirements for patentability seeks to further
158
this objective. But given that the presumption of patentability presupposes that every patent application fully complies
159
with each requirement, an important question is whether the
presumption of patentability can interfere with the functioning
of the statutory requirements and actually impede scientific
and technological progress.
It seems that the negative impact of the presumption has a
greater adverse effect on some statutory requirements than on
others. For instance, certain judicially created rules and stand160
161
ards pertaining to the law of novelty and nonobviousness
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws . . . is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful
arts.’” (citations omitted)); EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 125–26 (2002) (explaining that in the latter
part of the eighteenth century, the term “science” was synonymous with
“knowledge” and “learning”); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50,
54 (1949) (noting that the term “useful arts” is synonymous with the word
“technology”).
158. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
148 (1989) (noting that an invention which lacks novelty not only adds nothing
to the sum of human knowledge, but “would in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use”); Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting
that the purpose of the enablement requirement is to ensure enrichment of
public knowledge); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“The utility requirement has its origin in article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which indicates that the purpose of empowering Congress to authorize the granting of patents is ‘to promote progress of . . . useful arts.”’).
159. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160. Novelty ensures that an invention is new by denying a patent if the
claimed subject matter is identical to what is already known. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2006); In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(citations omitted). An invention enjoys a presumption of novelty, which
means that the examiner must prove that the invention already exists in the
prior art. In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (quoting § 102, which
states that “a person shall be entitled to a patent unless [one of the statutory
exclusions is shown]”); see also supra Part I.A. To illustrate how the novelty
doctrine can temper the presumption, suppose that the invention at issue is a
device, and the examiner finds a prior art reference which discloses a picture
of an identical device but does not explain how to make it. The courts have
held that the examiner is allowed to presume that a PHOSITA could have
made the device disclosed in the prior art. In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d
1282, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
314 F.3d 1313, 1355 & n.21 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining this presumption and
its roots in policy). To move forward, the burden shifts to the applicant to
prove that a PHOSITA could not have made the device without undue experimentation. Id. (citing In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). If the
applicant cannot do this, the device is unpatentable for a lack of novelty. See
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can temper the presumption in certain situations by placing a
162
heavier burden on the applicant. Denying a patent in these
situations fulfills a basic policy objective of the patent system:
to not allow a patent to issue which would impinge upon the
public’s right to unfettered access to technology already in the
163
public domain.

Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450–52 (outlining the burden-shifting process); In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (stating that an applicant must carry
the burden of proof to prevail).
161. Nonobviousness ensures that an invention is “new enough.” 1 DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01, at 3–9 (2012); see also Joseph Scott
Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 2 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007)
(“[N]onobviousness divides the patentably new from the unpatentably new.”).
The law denies patents for trivial extensions of technology already in the public domain. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see sources cited supra note 127.
Nonobviousness does not target inventions that are identically disclosed in the
prior art, but rather those that are sufficiently close to the prior art and within
the PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time the claimed invention is made. 35
U.S.C. § 103(a); see CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 305 (2d ed.
2011). An examiner must evaluate nonobviousness by considering the scope
and content of the relevant prior art; the differences between the prior art and
the claimed invention, the PHOSITA’s level of skill, and secondary considerations which provide objective proof of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). The scope and flexible nature of the
nonobviousness standard “has traditionally represented the principal substantive hurdle for patentability.” Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal
Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
19 (2004). See generally NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (providing a compilation of
words addressing the nonobviousness standard). Importantly for present purposes, the barrier is now much higher than before, following a recent Supreme
Court decision which makes it easier to reject patent applications for a lack of
nonobviousness. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007)
(rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsistency with the “expansive and flexible” approach set forth in Supreme
Court precedent). After KSR, the Director of the PTO even stated that “some
claims that may have been found to be non-obvious before KSR will now correctly be found to be obvious.” David A. Kappos, The Impact of KSR, DIRS. FORUM: DAVID A. KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://www
.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/the_impact_of_ksr.
162. See, e.g., Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1287–88; see also discussion supra
note 160.
163. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998); see also Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the use of the public.”); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[N]o patent should be granted
which withdraws from the public domain technology already available to the
public.” (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 6)).
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However, the situation is quite different for enablement—
the patentability requirement which “lies at the heart of the
164
patent bargain . . . .” By requiring an applicant to provide a
disclosure sufficient to teach a PHOSITA how to make and use
the full scope of the invention without undue experimenta165
tion, enablement ensures that the applicant’s disclosure sufficiently enriches public knowledge in exchange for the gov166
ernment-granted right to exclude.
There is hope that the
167
168
knowledge gained will reduce R&D waste, spur creativity,
169
and ultimately extend the frontiers of science and technology.
Importantly,
and
in
contrast
to
novelty
and
nonobviousness, the presumption of patentability is not tempered in the enablement context because the substantive law of
170
enablement has a strong pro-patent bias. This becomes clear
when one looks at the burden faced by an examiner who wants
to mount an enablement challenge. The key factor in the enablement inquiry is the substantive teaching provided in the ap164. 3 CHISUM, supra note 161, § 7.01, at 7–9; see LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth
Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing enablement as the essential aspect of the patent bargain).
165. See supra notes 70, 72 (describing the “without undue experimentation” requirement for enablement).
166. See Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,
533 (1966) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”);
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 157, at 143 (explaining that an essential purpose
of the patent system under the quid pro quo (or “exchange-for-secrets”) rationale is to assure the dissemination to the public of technical information it
would not otherwise get); FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 3–4 (explaining
that enablement plays a central role in “safeguard[ing] the patent system’s
disclosure function by ensuring relatively swift dissemination of technical information from which others . . . can learn”).
167. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 267 n.79 (1994).
168. See MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 15–19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge which other creative individuals can use and improve upon); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548–49 (2009) (“[D]isclosure can stimulate others to
design around the invention or conceive of new inventions—either by improving upon the invention or by being inspired by it—even during the patent
term.” (citations omitted)); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59
SMU L. REV. 123, 132–33 (2006) (making a similar argument).
169. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW § 1.2, at 6 (2004) (noting that patents enrich the public domain and thus
support further innovation).
170. Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts,
56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 143–54 (2008).
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171

plicant’s disclosure. Gauging the sufficiency of this teaching
is easiest when the examiner can evaluate actual experimental
data or the details of one or more working embodiments of the
172
invention. But unlike the rules of mainstream science, which
173
“require actual performance of every experimental detail” as
a prerequisite for publication, in patent law an applicant can
obtain a patent with no (or very little) actual proof of concept or
174
pre-filing experimentation. In fact, patent law “explicitly assumes the need for more experimentation after filing to actual175
ly implement the invention.” Nevertheless, examiners must
afford every application a presumption of enablement even if
176
there is minimal teaching disclosed therein.
While this presumption might not be a cause for concern
177
for simple inventions like paper clips and broom rakes, it
raises questions for more complex inventions like chemical
178
compounds or sophisticated devices. These inventions often
171. See Sitrick v. DreamWorks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting that an enablement analysis begins with the disclosure).
172. Cf. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621, 652–53 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function]
(advocating for a working example requirement for complex technologies
which would, among other things, simplify the enablement analysis).
173. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The
mere fact that something has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself,
a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications purporting to disclose how to do
it.” (quoting In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956))). It is well
settled in U.S. patent law that the concept itself—and not any physical act—is
the key facet of the inventive process. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S.
55, 60–61 (1998) (“[T]he word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that
idea.”).
175. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93 (2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Early Filing] (citing Impax
Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
176. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining
that the Patent Office must accept the applicant’s disclosure “as in compliance
with the enabling requirement of the first paragraph of § 112 unless there is
reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained therein which
must be relied on for enabling support”); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“[A]pplicants should not have been required to substantiate their
presumptively correct disclosure to avoid a rejection under the first paragraph
of § 112.” (citing Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224)).
177. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 644 (arguing that
a PHOSITA can make simple inventions with a minimal amount of teaching
from the inventor).
178. See id.
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require detailed teaching and guidance for the PHOSITA to
179
make and use. The absence of working examples, combined
180
with the aforementioned information deficit, make it hard for
181
examiners to adequately gauge enablement. It is also likely
that a PHOSITA will need to engage in undue experimentation
182
to practice the full scope of the invention.
Though it is true that the Federal Circuit has started to police compliance with enablement more aggressively in recent
183
years, the fact still remains that an examiner who questions
enablement still bears the burdens of both building a prima facie case of nonenablement and carrying the ultimate burden of

179. See id. at 644–45 (arguing that PHOSITAs in complex fields must often engage in trial and error to figure out what works; in fields like chemistry,
there is a danger that embodiments not actually reduced to practice cannot be
made); see also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (determining that a disclosure which enabled an injector with
a pressure jacket was insufficient to support a claim that covered injectors
both with and without a pressure jacket); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d
1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that a written description which only
described a single embodiment of the invention, using aluminum with a certain percentage of silicon, failed to enable claims covering embodiments with
other percentages of silicon).
180. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
181. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d
1369, 1378–79 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that in the absence of its own testing
facilities, the Patent Office must rely on information presented to it); FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9 (“Yet the PTO lacks testing facilities, and assertions that cannot be overcome by documentary evidence promptly identifiable
by the examiner often must be accepted.”). A Patent Office official has explained the problem:
[T]o a large degree when the going gets tough, certainly the applicant is in the position to have the experts to do the testing, to submit
documentary evidence to show why the examiner should allow the
case. And, of course[,] we don’t have laboratories, and we don’t have
independent experts in that regard. So therefore, we are really compelled to accept some of that, particularly from the standpoint of the
fact finding, that is presented to us.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen G. Kunin, former Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy at the Patent Office).
182. In certain complex fields, “the technical scope and substance of the
disclosure are very important because the PHOSITA must rely heavily, if not
exclusively, on the instruction provided within the four corners of the patent
document in order to practice the invention.” Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1528 (2011); see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (making a similar observation);
In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining that working examples are desirable in complex technologies).
183. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); cases cited supra note 179.

2013]

PRESUMPTION OF PATENTABILITY

1021

184

persuasion on the issue. These burdens tip the scales toward
patent issuance not only because of the examiner’s time pres185
sures and incentives discussed above, but also because “[i]t is
actually very difficult to offer rigorous proof that something
186
cannot be done . . . .” Thus, it is easy to see how dubiously enabled patents (and thus, patents of dubious quality) can slip
through the cracks.
While all would agree that the issuance of nonenabled patents is far from ideal, there is less consensus as to whether or
how to address the problem. For instance, it has been argued
that suboptimal enablement is not surprising—and perhaps
justifiable—given that “the patent law[s] place[] strong pressure on filing the patent application early in the development of
the technology, often before . . . all of the boundaries [are] fully
187
explored.”
Commentators point out that inventors must often file before actually reducing the invention to practice in order to at188
189
tract investors,
minimize risk,
and to safeguard patent
190
rights in the United States and abroad.
184. See discussion supra Part I.A.
185. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
186. Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCIENCE 763, 764 (1967); see also Edward C. Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure Rejections (Part I), 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 217, 219–20 (1980)
(explaining that obtaining proof can be a major problem for examiners, particularly since they must provide reasons and evidence to establish a prima facie
case of unpatentability).
187. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis added), rev’d on
other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–71 (1977) [hereinafter Kitch, Nature and Function] (explaining the rules in patent law that force
and permit early filing).
188. It is axiomatic in patent law that many inventors must rely on investors to cover the hefty costs of patent procurement and commercialization. See
JOHN SAMSON, INVENTIONS AND THEIR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1896)
(“To have the use of capital is nearly always indispensable for the development
of an invention, and, unless the inventor is of that fortunate class who have
the means to work their own patents, he must appeal for support to one or
more people with money.”); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age
of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143–44 (2000) (discussing the need for venture capital); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence
Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759 (1999) (“The prospect of
certainty in the patentee’s property interest has several benefits, one of which
is to create a sense of security which permits the patentee to secure risk capital from investors, which in turn facilitates the commercialization of the
claimed invention.” (citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[E]ncouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamen-

1022

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:990

But this problem warrants more attention because allowing dubiously enabled patents to issue can impede scientific
and technological progress. For example, the current regime
encourages inventors to file patents on underdeveloped inven191
tions, or worse, on mere ideas. Such patents often provide
dubious guidance to the PHOSITA, add little or nothing to the
192
public storehouse of technical knowledge, and supply little
193
technical fodder for follow-on researchers to build upon. In
addition, these patents can create insurmountable roadblocks
194
(intentionally or not)
for others with meritorious inven195
tions.
tal purpose of the patent grant . . . .”))).
189. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV.
341, 393–94 (2010) (“If building a prototype is costly—take, for example, fabricating a new type of computer chip—the risks of not securing a patent [before
actual reduction to practice] may be too large to justify doing so.”).
190. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (encouraging diligence by penalizing inventors for delay in filing patent applications); Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272 (invoking an
absolute novelty requirement which regards any pre-filing disclosure, including activity by the inventor, as patent defeating).
191. Cf. Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 453 (2007) (explaining that the lack of a requirement for an inventor “[to] actually have a complete and operative invention . . . [at the time of filing increases the] potential that the [claims] will protect speculative ideas . . . . With just a little time, money, and imagination, one
may [obtain a patent] . . . without inventing anything . . . .”).
192. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
193. In other words, the disclosure probably lacks sufficient technical detail
to be helpful. Thus, it does little to advance technological progress, which is
commanded by the Constitution. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966).
194. For instance, so-called “nuisance” prior art describing an unworkable
invention “can . . . be generated as a result of a bona fide attempt at a constructive reduction to practice that for some unexpected reason fails to work as
disclosed.” David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 221, 223–24 (1999). Innocuously disclosed information which has the same effect is often described as “technical junk.” Id.
at 222, 223 n.3.
195. A good example is when an early filer strategically drafts claims
which cover undeveloped technology. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 19, at
67 (arguing that the practice “penalizes real innovators who operate in the
shadow of early, broad claims”); Wainwright, supra note 194, at 221–22 (explaining how nuisance prior art can discourage applicants to the point of
abandoning their patent applications); see also Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective
on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1975 (2005) (exploring the
practice and discussing how patent prosecutors draft claims to “mitigate problems with language and later-developed technology”).
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III. TOWARD A PRESUMPTION OF UNPATENTABILITY
This Article has shown that various presumptions and procedural aspects of patent examination tip the scales in favor of
issuance once a patent application is filed. And since applicants
are presumptively entitled to receive a patent, anyone who files
a patent on anything is “in a really great position” from the
196
outset. From an evidentiary standpoint, the biggest problem
facing an examiner who seeks to challenge patentability is the
dual burden of building a prima facie case of patentability and
carrying the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue by a
197
preponderance of the evidence. According to current case law,
the Patent Office must issue a patent if the examiner fails to do
198
both. To address this problem and rebalance the scales of patentability, this Part offers a new evidentiary framework for
patent examination.
A. RESTRUCTURING THE PROOF PARADIGM
1. How It Would Work
The starting point for the proposal is that rebalancing the
scales of patentability—and thus making the issuance of a patent far from a sure thing—will require three key changes in the
rules of patent examination. First, the locution of the dual burdens would be decoupled such that the initial burden of coming
forward with evidence of unpatentability (building a prima facie case) would remain with the examiner but the burden of
persuasion on the ultimate issue would now rest with the applicant. Second, the current presumption of patentability would
be replaced with a presumption of unpatentability. As a result,
an applicant who could not adduce proof of patentability by a
preponderance of the evidence would face a rejection. Third, in
an effort to produce more technically robust patents, the restrictions on amending patent documents after filing would be
relaxed so that an applicant who adduces proof of patentability
could incorporate the additional information into the issued patent.

196. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 5, at 9 n.61 (“[P]atent applicants are in
a really great position because by filing an application they’re presumptively
entitled to receive the grant.” (quoting Professor John R. Thomas)).
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. See supra note 45.
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2. Illustrations
Adopting this framework would recalibrate the entire patent procurement process by making it less pro-applicant. Yet,
given the differences between the various statutory standards
of patentability, it stands to reason that the proposed regime
would have a greater impact in certain factual scenarios. Two
scenarios are explored below.
a. Close Cases
The first scenario is when the examiner and the applicant
199
are at or near equipoise over patentability. To illustrate, suppose that in 2007 an inventor develops a stainless steel dinner
fork with five tines. Believing that the invention does a better
job of spearing food and holding it in place than the traditional
forks (with fewer tines), the inventor files a patent application
later that year claiming the fork. Though multi-tined forks exist in the prior art, the claimed device is novel because it is not
200
identically disclosed therein.
Turning to nonobviousness, the examiner finds two prior
201
art references from the same field of endeavor which teach all
202
of the limitations of the claimed device: a cutlery book published in 1985 disclosing a four-tined stainless steel dinner fork
and a merchandise catalog from 1939 disclosing a silver fivetined serving fork. After making the factual findings set forth
203
by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. as to the
scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the
prior art and the claimed invention, and the PHOSITA’s level
204
of skill, the examiner concludes that it would have been obvi-

199. In other words, having considered all of the evidence, the examiner
concludes that it is equally likely that the invention is patentable or
unpatentable. See Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51,
51–52 (1961) (discussing equipoise).
200. For a discussion of the novelty requirement, see supra note 160.
201. Nonobviousness is discussed supra note 161. Briefly, a reference qualifies as § 103(a) prior art if it is analogous to the field of invention. In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 35 (1966)). References drawn from the same field of endeavor are considered analogous. Id. at 987.
202. A patent claim must define “the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006). A claim element further limits the breadth of the claim. 1 CHISUM, supra note 161, at Gl-3. In this
illustration, “stainless steel,” “dinner,” and “five-tine[d]” are claim limitations.
203. 383 U.S. at 17.
204. Id.; see also discussion supra note 127.
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ous for a PHOSITA at the time of the invention to produce the
claimed device.
The examiner supports this conclusion with two rationales.
First, the examiner contends that a PHOSITA could have combined the teachings of the two references in a predictable man205
ner to produce the claimed device with a reasonable expecta206
tion of success.
Second, the examiner contends that the
claimed invention was obvious to try because a PHOSITA seeking to solve the problem articulated by the inventor would have
been aware of a finite number of predictable solutions (adding
tines) and thus would have had good reason to pursue and a
reasonable expectation of successfully arriving at the claimed
207
invention.
208
Having made a prima facie case of obviousness, the bur209
den of going forward shifts to the applicant. The applicant attempts to rebut the prima facie case by arguing that the
claimed device satisfies a long-felt but unresolved need in the
210
211
art. The examiner responds with a request for actual proof;
specifically, “objective evidence that an art recognized problem
212
existed in the art for a long period of time without solution.”
Reminded that “the mere passage of time without the claimed

205. See MPEP, supra note 56, § 2143(A) (noting that combining references
according to known methods to produce a predictable result is an appropriate
rationale to support a conclusion of obviousness); cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (explaining that a combination of elements
“must do more than yield a predictable result”).
206. See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Obviousness does not require absolute predictability . . . . [A]ll that is required is a
reasonable expectation of success.”); see also PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc.
v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming “reasonable expectation of success” jurisprudence post-KSR).
207. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (endorsing the “obvious to try” rationale);
MPEP, supra note 56, § 2143(A) (same).
208. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (interpreting
Graham v. John Deere to require the Patent Office to provide a factual basis
for a § 103 rejection as a part of the prima facie case).
209. Id.
210. See supra note 127.
211. During the course of patent examination, the examiner may request
“[t]echnical information known to [the] applicant concerning . . . the disclosure, the claimed subject matter, other factual information pertinent to patentability, or concerning the accuracy of the examiner’s stated interpretation
of such items.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (a)(1)(viii) (2012).
212. MPEP, supra note 56, § 716.04. In addition, “significant improvements
in the art that bear on the inventor’s solution dilute the significance of prior
need and failure.” 2 CHISUM, supra note 161, § 5.05[1]b.
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invention is not evidence of nonobviousness,” the applicant
abandons this strategy and attempts to prove nonobviousness
214
by showing praise for the invention by others in the art. The
proffered evidence includes a copy of a short write-up about the
invention in a cutlery trade publication and positive commentary about it in Better Homes and Gardens magazine.
215
Upon consideration of the entire record, the examiner
finds that the nonobviousness issue is in equipoise. Under the
current regime, equipoise means that “the applicant is entitled
216
to the patent” absent any other grounds for unpatentability
because “the applicant does not bear the ultimate burden of
217
persuasion on the issue.” The proposed paradigm, on the other hand, would produce the opposite result thereby leaving the
new fork unpatentable.
Denying patentability in this context makes sense from a
technical standpoint and aligns with core goals of the patent
system. Applying the proposed paradigm allows the
nonobviousness requirement to truly fulfill its statutory purpose: to prevent the issuance of patents for trivial extensions of
218
what is already in the public domain. It does so by targeting
213. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 991–92 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Iron Grip
Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
214. The Federal Circuit has recognized praise as a secondary (objective)
indicator of nonobviousness. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Allen Archery, Inc. v.
Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (considering praise));
see also 2 CHISUM, supra note 161, § 5.05[4] (exploring the history of “reaction
of experts in the field to the invention upon its initial public appearance” as
objective evidence of nonobviousness).
215. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
216. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concurring).
217. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three:
Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1119
n.13 (1987) (“[T]he law handles a finding of equipoise by means of the burden
of persuasion.”); James, supra note 199, at 51–52 (noting that in equipoise, the
party that bears the risk of nonpersuasion loses).
218. See discussion supra note 127. By constitutional command, a patent
can neither remove such knowledge from the public domain nor limit free access to those materials already available. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 6 (1966); see also Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 187, at 283 (arguing that patents should not be granted for the use and development of known
technical information because “proper incentives for its acquisition and use
exist without a property right”). Rather, a patent can only be awarded for
technical advances which add to the storehouse of useful knowledge. Graham,
383 U.S. at 6 (“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”); cf. Great
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inventions that are sufficiently close to the prior art and within
the PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time the claimed inven219
tion is made. Thus, nonobviousness “creates a ‘patent-free’
220
zone around the state of the art,” allowing the PHOSITA to
substitute materials, streamline processes, and “[to make] the
usual marginal improvements which occur as a technology ma221
tures.”
The nonobviousness requirement seeks to “weed[] out those
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the
222
inducement of a patent.” Here, modifying known devices (a
four-tined stainless steel dinner fork and a five-tined serving
fork) to produce a predictable, trivial modification (a stainlesssteel five-tined dinner fork) draws on knowledge already in the
public domain and well within the PHOSITA’s skill and ordi223
nary creativity. Thus, (the inducement of) a patent is unnec-

Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)
(“The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something;
only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.”). As the Supreme Court recently explained:
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality
around us new works based on instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, define a new threshold
from which innovation starts once more. And as progress beginning
from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course,
the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive
rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle,
rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); cf. Edmund W. Kitch,
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV.
293, 301 (explaining that nonobviousness is based on the principle that “a patent should not be granted for an innovation unless [it] would have been unlikely to have been developed absent the prospect of a patent”).
219. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); NARD, supra note 161, at 305 (discussing the nonobviousness requirement); cf. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The proper tool for assessing sufficient contribution to the useful arts is the obviousness requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 103.”).
220. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW
288 (3d ed. 2009).
221. Id.
222. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
223. See Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57,
60–62 (1969) (explaining that an invention derived from old elements which
does no more than expected is obvious, despite being new and useful); cf. KSR,
550 U.S. at 421, 427 (noting that the claimed design step was “well within the
grasp” of a PHOSITA—a person of “ordinary skill in the relevant art”). Joseph
Scott Miller elaborates:
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essary since the fork came about through ordinary technologi224
cal progress.
b. Challenging the Sufficiency of Disclosure
The second scenario is when the sufficiency of the applicant’s disclosure—and enablement in particular—is at issue. To
illustrate, consider another hypothetical example. Suppose an
inventor at a drug company seeks to patent a new class of
pharmaceutical compounds. The patent application includes a
generic claim that, by claiming a core chemical structure with
an array of twenty variables appended to it, encompasses bil225
lions of compounds. As is typical in pharmaceutical cases, the
226
claim is incredibly broad —here because it is possible to substitute each of the twenty variables appended to the core strucWhen a [PHOSITA] encounters a new problem, he or she will create a
new ordinary invention—an obvious invention—as a matter of course.
We do not need to provide a reward to draw into existence the obvious
inventions that fall within the [PHOSITA’s] skill. The need to solve
practical problems is sufficient to spark [their development], and
their suitability for the needs they satisfy is itself a sufficient reward.
Miller, supra note 161, at 2.
224. See supra note 218 and text accompanying note 220; Michael J.
Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of
Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 549 (2008) (“The
nonobviousness threshold may be used as a ‘stick’ to induce researchers to
pursue more difficult, socially preferred research projects.”); Miller, supra note
161, at 2 (“It is socially wasteful for us to pay a patent-backed premium for an
innovation that we are almost certain to receive for free and just as early.”).
225. See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining
that the practice of describing a class of chemical compounds in terms of structural formulas, where the substituents are recited in the claim language, has
been sanctioned by the courts). This style of claiming—ubiquitous in the chemical and pharmaceutical arts—is called Markush practice. See In re Harnisch,
631 F.2d 716, 719–20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining the history and current law
of Markush practice). For an example of this style of claiming, see U.S. Patent
No. 4,801,613 (filed June 17, 1987). Claim 1 of the ’613 patent refers to “[a]
modified bradykinin type peptide having the formula A-Arg-B-C-D-W-X-Y-ZArg,” where the variables A, B, C, D, W, X, Y, Z are each generic substructures
reciting smaller peptides or amino acids. Thus, the primary generic structure
contains eight smaller generic substructures. See id. cols. 19–20, ll. 1–41. All
together, this claim covers 10,235,904 formulations of a peptide. For an extreme example, see U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991) (including
a structural formula in claim 1 which encompasses at least one novemdecillion
60
(10 , or one followed by sixty zeroes) compounds).
226. See supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing “broad” claims); see
also Ned A. Israelson & Rose M Thiessen, Chemical and Pharmaceutical Patents, in DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 455, 457 (Bradley
C. Wright ed., 2008) (advising drafters of chemical patent applications to provide adequate support for claims that often covers billions of species).
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ture with countless organic functional groups. The patent application, however, only sets forth five compounds actually
made. These five compounds are closely related to each other in
that the same variable (one of the twenty) is substituted in
each.
After construing the claims, assessing the PHOSITA’s level
of skill, and evaluating the teaching provided in the patent ap228
plication, the examiner determines that the disclosure only
teaches a PHOSITA how to make a narrower subgenus of fivehundred compounds, not billions. As support for a prima facie
case of nonenablement for the broad genus, the examiner recognizes that
replacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often have
highly unpredictable results. . . . [E]ven a change as seemingly trivial
as replacing an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl
group . . . could result in either a significant improvement or reduction in the activity of the compound against a particular biological
229
target.

The point here is that a PHOSITA cannot extrapolate a result
from a few embodiments across a broad genus with a reasona230
ble expectation of success.
227. A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule with specific
chemical properties that represents a potential reaction site in a compound,
and thus determines a molecule’s chemical reactivity. See generally RICHARD
C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS (2d ed. 1999)
(providing a comprehensive list of functional group preparations).
228. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (discussing the factual
inquiries underlying the enablement analysis).
229. Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 891 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(explaining that with respect to the enablement of a method-of-treatment
claim, a PHOSITA “is well aware that subtle changes in chemical compounds
can radically alter the effects on a human body”).
230. In fields like chemistry, results are often unpredictable because researchers often must engage in trial and error to figure out what works and
what does not. Thus, a PHOSITA cannot predict if a reaction protocol which
works for one compound will work for others. See Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the chemical arts, “a slight variation . . . can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at all”); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (testing enablement by determining if a skilled scientist would
have believed reasonably that the inventor's success with the described embodiment(s) “could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success” to
other embodiments encompassed by the broad claims); In re Prutton, 200 F.2d
706, 712 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that claims to a class of chemical compounds, which were sufficiently broad to involve some speculation, lack enablement, notwithstanding the presence of the operative specific examples
within the class); Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 458 (1994).
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Consequently, the examiner rejects the broad generic claim
as prima facie nonenabled because a PHOSITA would have to
231
engage in undue experimentation to practice its full scope. At
this point the burden shifts to the applicant to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the PHOSITA’s knowledge
in combination with the applicant’s teaching can actually enable the full scope of the generic claim. In response, the applicant argues that a well-trained organic chemist would know
where to look in the scientific literature to fill in the technical
232
gaps. The examiner determines that the proffered evidence is
insufficient to rebut the prima facie case because it is not a
“persuasive argument[], supported by suitable [evidence] where
necessary, that [a PHOSITA] would be able to make and use
233
the claimed invention using the application as a guide.”
At this point, examination could take two paths. Consider
first the scenario in which the applicant is unable or unwilling
to produce the requisite evidence. Mindful of the presumption
of unpatentability, the applicant voluntarily cancels the broad
generic claim and pursues the narrower subgenus claim covering five-hundred compounds. The examiner allows that claim
and the applicant ultimately obtains a much narrower patent—
by eight orders of magnitude—than that which probably would
have issued under the current regime.

231. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 148, at 848 (explaining why such a
rejection is proper). There is a danger that embodiments not described either
cannot be made or may require experimentation which is unduly extensive.
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (explaining that “[e]nablement is lacking . . . because the undescribed
embodiments cannot be made, based on the disclosure . . . without undue experimentation”).
232. Applicants often point to the oft-cited statement that “a patent need
not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” Hybritech Inc.
v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that the written description need not necessarily describe how to
make and use every embodiment of the invention because the PHOSITA’s
“knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill in the
gaps” (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
However, “that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure.” Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cited with approval in
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
233. MPEP, supra note 56, § 2164.05; see also In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d
220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that a “rejection for failure to teach . . .
can be overcome by suitable proofs indicating that the teaching contained in
the specification is truly enabling”).
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Now consider a scenario in which the applicant adduces
additional proof of patentability—most likely experimental details for more of the claimed compounds. As far as the burden is
concerned, the additional technical information would provide
more enablement and allow the applicant to obtain a patent
with claims covering more than five-hundred compounds (but
still narrower than what was originally sought).
In this latter scenario, the proposed regime would allow
the applicant to amend the patent document to include this additional technical information. This would probably require the
Federal Circuit and the Patent Office to liberalize the “new
matter” doctrine which severely restricts the ability of appli234
cants to amend patent documents.
The key question is
whether the additional technical information “was inherently
235
contained in the original application” —a fact-based inquiry
which depends on “the nature of the disclosure, the state of the
236
art, and the nature of the added matter.” If the examiner
makes a positive finding, the additional technical information
would be incorporated into the issued patent. Thus, the resulting patent document would be more technically robust than the
one originally filed.
B. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
1. Retention of the Prima Facie Case
Recall that under the current regime, the examiner bears
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
237
unpatentability. Once established, the burden of production
shifts to the applicant to rebut the inference of unpatentability
234. When an applicant amends the written description, the Patent Office
instructs examiners to be on the alert for “new matter.” See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a)
(2006) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2012); MPEP, supra note 56, § 706.03(o) (alerting examiners). “The written description requirement [of 35 U.S.C. § 112] and
its corollary, the new matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 132, both serve to ensure that the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject
matter on the application filing date.” TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval
Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
235. TurboCare, 264 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.,
222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
236. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
237. See sources cited supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. A prima
facie case suffices as proof of a particular fact or issue “unless disproved or rebutted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (9th ed. 2009).
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238

by a preponderance of the evidence. If sufficient rebuttal evi239
dence is produced, the inference “is dissipated” and the examiner must consider all of the facts in evidence—including those
adduced during later stages of prosecution—before drawing a
240
final conclusion as to patentability. On the other hand, insufficient rebuttal evidence compels a conclusion of
241
unpatentability.
The prima facie case is retained as a procedural device in
the proposed framework for several reasons. First, in ex parte
matters, it serves as an orderly mechanism for initially produc242
ing evidence, and it “promotes the development of the written
243
record” of the proceedings before the Patent Office. The Federal Circuit has defended the prima facie case precisely because
of this information-gathering function:
[I]ts purpose is simply to provide sufficient notice to the applicant to
facilitate his effective submission of information. Since the applicant
is in the best position to cheaply provide information about the purported invention, the PTO’s authority to shift the burden to obtain
this information [after the prima facie case it met] is crucial to ensure
that the PTO is not mak[ing] patentability determinations on insuffi244
cient facts and information.

Second, without the prima facie case, an applicant would
be hard-pressed to figure out why the invention is
unpatentable. It would make little sense for the examiner “[to]
238. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Piasecki, 745
F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
239. Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472; see also In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When rebuttal evidence is provided, the prima facie case dissolves, and the decision is made on the entirety of the evidence.”); Oetiker, 977
F.2d at 1445 (“The term ‘prima facie case’ refers only to the initial examination step.”); cf. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 2491, at 305 (explaining that a presumption disappears when sufficient evidence is introduced to
rebut it).
240. See Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445 (“[T]he ultimate determination of patentability is made on the entire record.”); Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472 (noting
that once the prima facie inference is rebutted, “the examiner must consider
all of the evidence anew”); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976)
(warning examiners not to become analytically fixated on the prima facie case
or “to provide that decision with an undeservedly broadened umbrella effect”).
241. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3:6 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the function of the presumptions).
242. See Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472; see also In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 710
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he principle underlying orderly patent examination is
that the burden in the first instance is on the examiner to establish that the
claimed invention is prima facie unpatentable . . . .”).
243. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
244. Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
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sit mum, leaving the applicant to shoot arrows into the dark
hoping to somehow hit a secret objection harbored by the exam245
iner.” Finally, the prima facie case mitigates arbitrariness to
the extent that it prevents the Patent Office from denying pat246
ents without a sufficient factual basis.
2. Reallocation of the Burden of Persuasion
The principal significance of the burden of persuasion is to
determine, upon consideration of all of the evidence, which par247
ty wins if the decisionmaker is in doubt. Where the burden
rests can depend upon the existence of a presumption since the
248
latter can assign the former. This is the case in patent law
because assigning the burden to the Patent Office stems from
249
the presumption of patentability. Since the proposed frame-

245. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449 (Plager, J., concurring).
246. As Judge Plager once explained:
The “prima facie case” notion . . . seemingly was intended to leave
no doubt among examiners that they must state clearly and specifically any objections (the prima facie case) to patentability, and give
the applicant fair opportunity to meet those objections with evidence
and argument. To that extent the concept serves to level the playing
field and reduces the likelihood of administrative arbitrariness.
Id. (citation omitted); see also supra Part I.C (arguing that the current presumption of patentability is justified in part by the fear of Patent Office arbitrariness).
247. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 472
(6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; James, supra note 199,
at 51–52 (noting that in equipoise, the party that bears the risk of
nonpersuasion loses); Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach
to Proof Burdens, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 273–74 (2008) (“The party bearing
the burden of persuasion loses if the totality of both parties’ evidence leaves
the fact finder in equipoise regarding who should prevail.”).
248. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 343, at 500 (“A presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence and may assign the burden
of persuasion as well.”); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 843, 845 (1981) (noting that presumptions have been
used to allocate the burden of persuasion); Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697, 701 (1984)
(same). Presumptions themselves are often “created by courts and by legislatures to accomplish various objectives or policies.” Mason Ladd, Presumptions
in Civil Actions, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 279. Thus, creating a presumption
which allocates the burden of persuasion allows the courts and legislatures to
essentially choose the preferred result in close cases. See Paul H. Robinson,
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 257
n.215 (1982).
249. See, e.g., In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J.,
concurring); Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1449; In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016
(C.C.P.A. 1967).
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work flips the presumption to one of unpatentability, it logically reallocates the burden of persuasion to the applicant.
This reallocation is consistent with the scholarly literature
on evidence. At first glance this might seem surprising because
the burden of persuasion often rests with the same party that
251
carries the initial burden of production. Yet this is not a
hard-and-fast rule. Evidence scholars have long urged that
there is no single overarching principle which dictates how the
252
burden of persuasion should be assigned. Rather, it may de253
pend upon a myriad of factors. Two common factors—both of
which are relevant for patent examination—are access to proof
254
and substantive policy considerations.
A doctrine has emerged which assigns the burden of persuasion to a party if it has superior information needed to prove
an issue, even if that party does not bear the initial burden of
255
producing evidence. The Supreme Court recognizes and ap250. See supra Part III.A.1.
251. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 477 (recognizing that the two burdens generally rest with the same party); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 241, § 3:3 (same); 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5122, at 401 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]he same party who has the burden of persuasion also starts out with the burden of producing evidence . . . .”).
252. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 477; see also
James, supra note 199, at 62 (“[T]he production burden and the persuasion
burden [do] not always march hand in hand.” (citing JAMES BRADLEY THAYER,
A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 370–78 (1898))).
253. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 477 (explaining that the allocation “will depend upon the weight that is given to any
one or more of several factors, including: (1) the natural tendency to place the
burdens on the party desiring change, (2) special policy considerations such as
those disfavoring certain defenses, (3) convenience, (4) fairness, and (5) the
judicial estimate of the probabilities”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
241, § 3:3 (listing five factors: custom, substantive policy, access to proof,
probable truth, and proof unavailable); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 251,
§ 5122, at 401–02 (discussing “disturb[ing] the status quo” and “[t]he Three
Ps—Policy, Probability, and Possession of Proof”); Lakin v. Watkins Associated
Indus., 863 P.2d 179, 189 (Cal. 1993) (“In determining whether the normal allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the courts consider a number
of factors: the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact, the
availability of the evidence to the parties, the most desirable result in terms of
public policy in the absence of proof of the particular fact, and the probability
of the existence or nonexistence of the fact.” (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 500
cmt. at 431 (West 1966)).
254. See sources cited supra note 253.
255. See JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW 179 (1947) (asserting that the burden of persuasion “is to be
borne by the party having peculiar knowledge of the facts”); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 247, § 337, at 475 (“A doctrine often repeated by the
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plies this doctrine because “considerations of fairness” require
allocation to a party if the facts needed to establish an issue lie
256
“peculiarly within [that party’s] knowledge.”
Several commentators have argued that this doctrine also makes sense
257
from an economic perspective.
In the patent examination context, it is the applicant who
258
has superior information about the invention. But applicants
may be reluctant to share all of this information with the examiner. As Professor Timothy Holbrook has explained, “applicants
do have incentives to withhold certain information and behave
strategically, in part due to concerns over competition and in
part due to concerns over the legal consequences their disclo259
sures may create.” This is why the Patent Office must imcourts is that where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the
knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving the issue.”);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 241, § 3:3 (discussing access to proof);
Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil
Actions—An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76
NW. U. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982) (noting that the burden of persuasion is frequently allocated to the party on issues peculiarly within the knowledge of
that party).
256. United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253,
256 n.5 (1957) (“The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does
not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of his adversary.”); see Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812
F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating an exception to a party’s burden of persuasion “when the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge
of one party, and it would therefore be particularly onerous to require the other party to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue” (internal quotations
omitted)); see also WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 2486, at 291 (noting “peculiar means of knowledge” as a factor to consider in assigning the burden).
257. See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997) (“One party may have easier access to evidence than his opponent, meaning he can assemble the appropriate evidence at lower cost than his opponent. Other things
being equal, the lower one party’s relative costs, the stronger the argument for
giving him the burden of proof.”). A similar argument can be made for a party
that has greater resources. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1543 (1999) (arguing that burdens
of production and persuasion are economizing devices and should therefore be
assigned to the party with greatest access to resources).
258. See supra notes 132, 136, 181 and accompanying text.
259. Holbrook, supra note 138, at 818. With regard to competition, “patent
applicants have the incentive to disclose ‘just enough’ to satisfy the patentability requirements of § 112 while retaining other aspects as trade secrets.” Id.
(citing R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the
Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 214–16 (2002)). Regarding legal consequences, “the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the patent document gives an
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plement rules to compel disclosure in order to help minimize its
260
information deficit. In addition, commentators have argued
that the Patent Office’s limited resources hinder its ability to
acquire all of the information that it needs to conduct robust
261
examinations. On the other hand, the applicant is often the
262
“cheapest cost provider” vis-à-vis the Patent Office when it
263
comes to furnishing information for patent examination. For
these reasons, the superior information doctrine should be considered as a factor in reallocating the burden of persuasion to
the applicant.
Another important factor for allocating the burden of per264
suasion is the policy goal of the underlying substantive law.
Some commentators suggest that this may be the most im265
portant factor. Absent clear direction from Congress, the federal courts are not hesitant to allocate the burden in a manner
266
consistent with their perceptions of good policy. Importantly
for present purposes, sometimes this policy choice is supported
267
or reinforced with a presumption. A good example comes from
the common law of admiralty. In cases where a vessel hits a
stationary object, a rebuttable presumption of fault arises and
268
the burden of persuasion rests with the alliding vessel. This
269
rule furthers the policy goal of avoiding maritime accidents.
incentive for patent applicants to limit their disclosures to avoid potential estoppel-like consequences.” Id.
260. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 28, infra notes 285, 295 and accompanying text.
262. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Commentary, Toward a System
of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 29 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.pdf.
263. Id. at 28 (“[W]here the cost of having the patent applicant provide information is relatively low, and particularly where the cost to the patent office
of providing information is prohibitively high, the law allocates the cost of the
information to the party seeking the exclusive rights.”).
264. See WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 2486, at 291 (explaining
that allocating the burden of persuasion can be “merely a question of policy
and fairness”); James, supra note 199, at 61 (noting that substantive policy
considerations may be influential).
265. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 241, § 3:3 (“First and perhaps most important, burdens are allocated to serve substantive policy . . . .”);
see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 251, § 5122, at 402 (“In determining
the placement of burdens of proof, courts begin with the policy of the substantive law . . . .”).
266. See Allen, supra note 255, at 898.
267. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 251, § 5122, at 400.
268. See The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1895) (holding that a vessel
moving under its own power that allides with a stationary object is presumed

2013]

PRESUMPTION OF PATENTABILITY

1037

The same rationale extends by analogy to the patent law
context. As discussed in the next section, allocating the burden
of persuasion to the applicant in combination with a presumption of unpatentability could be used to modulate applicant behavior and further certain policy objectives of the patent sys270
tem.
3. Allowing Post-Filing Amendments to Patent Documents
The proposal contemplates that inventors who are able to
adduce proof of patentability will seek to incorporate the addi271
tional information into the patent document. Allowing a postfiling amendment to the disclosure would yield an issued patent which would be more technically robust than what was
originally filed. Nevertheless, one might ask if liberalizing the
new matter doctrine would unfairly give an applicant a “second
272
bite at the apple” with respect to compliance with § 112. Possibly, but this prong of the proposal is designed to strike a bal273
ance between an inventor’s need to file early and a broader
interest in using disclosure to promote the patent system’s
274
overarching goal of scientific and technological progress. Finally, it is worth reiterating that allowing the post-filing
amendments would still yield claims in the issued patent which
would be narrower than those likely to issue under the current
275
regime.
to be at fault and has the burden of persuasion to prove otherwise); The Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 173 (1865) (holding that a drifting vessel that
allides with a stationary object is presumed to be at fault and has the burden
of persuasion to prove otherwise). These drifting-vessel rules essentially apply
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to admiralty cases. See Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l
Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
269. See Hood v. Knappton Corp., 986 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the policy goals of The Louisiana rule).
270. See infra Part III.C.
271. See supra Part III.A.1.
272. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“Every patent system must have some provision to prevent applicants
from using the amendment process to update their disclosures (claims or specifications) during their pendency before the patent office. Otherwise applicants
could add new matter to their disclosures and date them back to their original
filing date, thus defeating an accurate accounting of the priority of invention.”); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that compliance with enablement is gauged as of the applicant’s effective filing date).
273. See infra Part III.C.2.
274. See supra Part II.B.
275. Enablement places an outer limit on the scope of the claims. See Nat’l
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999). As discussed in the main text, under the current regime the
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C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1. Patent (Examination) Quality
There is a general consensus that an important policy goal
276
for patent law is to improve patent quality. An overarching
objective of quality improvement efforts is to reduce uncertain277
ty throughout the patent system. In theory, high patent quality would lead to less “uncertainty about the validity of granted
patents, uncertainty about the scope of granted patents, uncertainty about whether a particular invention is patentable, and
uncertainty about whether a valid patent will be fully en278
forced.”
Increased certainty would discourage opportunistic behavior such as rent-seeking patent acquisition and enforcement ac279
tivities; lower the overall amount, expense, and complexity of
presumption of enablement tips the scales toward the issuance of a patent
with broad claims. See supra notes 176–95 and accompanying text; e.g., supra
text accompanying notes 59–85 (providing a hypothetical example). Clearly
the proposed presumption of unpatentability and reallocated burdens of proof
would constrain claim scope, but exactly how much would depend on the nature and amount of proof adduced by the applicant. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
276. Jaffe, supra note 20, at 65.
277. For a description of some of the detrimental effects of uncertainty, see
FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 3, at 53–55 (explaining how low-quality patents
create uncertainty and hinder innovation); Note, Estopping the Madness at the
PTO: Improving Patent Administration Through Prosecution History Estoppel,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2164, 2165 (2003) (“[P]oor patent quality creates uncertainty over patent validity. This uncertainty increases transaction costs in licensing negotiations because parties must conduct duplicative research and prior
art searches to determine if a particular patent is valid and worth licensing.
Finally, by postponing the true validity determination until litigation, poor
patent quality strains judicial resources.”). Reducing uncertainty is a persistent concern in patent law. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304
U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (indicating that the primary purpose of notice is “to guard
against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others
arising from uncertainty as to their [respective] rights”); see also Christianson
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 813 (1988) (recognizing that one
of Congress’s goals in creating the Federal Circuit was to reduce uncertainty
in the application of patent law); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(“An essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of
claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process.”).
278. Wagner, supra note 3, at 2140.
279. See Thomas, Patent Administration Reform, supra note 10, at 731 (arguing that poor patent quality allows contracting parties to review patents to
asses and challenge their validity). “Rent seeking behavior may arise when the
holder of a poor quality patent seeks to enforce exclusionary rights that are
probably invalid or seeks to stretch a valid narrow exclusionary right to cover
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280

patent infringement litigation;
and “strengthen the incentives of private actors to engage in value-maximizing activities
281
such as innovation or commercial transactions.”
The quality of an issued patent depends on the quality of
282
the underlying Patent Office examination. To a large extent
the assurance of a good Patent Office examination is all about
283
information. It is doubtful that other patent reform efforts
will significantly improve patent quality unless and until something is done about the information deficit at the Patent Of284
fice. To explain, it should be clear that an examiner must
have all of the relevant technical information in hand in order
to accurately gauge patentability. But the Patent Office’s lim285
286
ited resources, combined with examiner production goals
acts outside the proper scope of the patent.” Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality
and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 240 (2004) (citing Michael
J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512–16 (2003)); see also Wagner, supra note
3, at 2144 (explaining that the uncertainty brought about by a low-quality patent system allows it “[to] be exploited—whether by filing low-probability, highcost suits or by seeking large numbers of low-quality patents to use as leverage for settlement”).
280. Wagner, supra note 3, at 2144.
281. Wendy Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Reform: Innovation Issues,
in PATENT TECHNOLOGY 1, 6 (Juanita M. Branes ed., 2007); see also Qin Shi,
Patent System Meets New Sciences: Is the Law Responsive to Changing Technologies and Industries?, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 317, 334–35 (2005) (explaining how patents of questionable quality can create ambiguities and uncertainties in the scope of ownership rights which can burden intellectual
property transactions and thereby impede commercialization).
282. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, ch. 1, at 19 (citing ADVISORY COMM. ON
INDUS. INNOVATION, INDUS. ADVISORY SUBCOMM. ON PATENT & INFO. POLICY,
REPORT ON PATENT POLICY 153–55 (1979)).
283. See id. (arguing that the search for prior art is key to a quality patent
and advocating for more resources to improve examination procedures);
Cotropia, Inequitable Conduct, supra note 26, at 748 (“The assurance of a good
patent quality is all about information . . . .”).
284. See supra Part I.C.1. For a proposal which seeks to mitigate the Patent Office’s information deficit, see Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2041, 2041–42 (2012) (proposing a new medium of disclosure
which would both provide examiners with more information and serve the
public good by enriching the public storehouse of knowledge).
285. For example, an examiner’s ability to get the relevant technical information is subject to the Patent Office’s infrastructural limitations. See John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 102 (2002) (“The predominance of U.S. patents
[as cited prior art] may . . . reflect the limitations of the PTO systems for
searching: the PTO is much more likely to find documents that it itself has
generated.”); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1500 (“[M]uch of
the most relevant prior art isn’t easy to find—it consists of [third-party activities] that don’t show up in any searchable database and will not be found by
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287

and time pressures, prevent this from happening. Indeed, for
many inventions no one believes that the information that the
examiner uncovers in the search of the prior art (for assessing
novelty and nonobviousness) sufficiently represents the body of
288
preexisting knowledge. And notwithstanding the applicant’s
289
duty of candor, it is hard to realistically believe that everything that the applicant knows about the invention ends up be290
fore the examiner. When the examiner lacks the requisite
technical information to gauge patentability, it is likely that
291
low-quality patents will issue.
The proposed regime helps ameliorate the information deficit. While it would not relieve the examiner of the burden of
compiling sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of

examiners in a hurry.”); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent
Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196 (2007) (“A high-quality prior art
search is difficult because of resource and time limitations.”); Thomas, Collusion, supra note 2, at 318–19 (explaining that in newer technologies, examiners often cannot obtain the most recent technical literature); Bhaven N.
Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (Sept.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.immagic.com/
eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/COLUMBIA/C050902S.pdf (finding that examiners are less likely to find non-patent prior art and foreign patents).
286. “Production goals are the number of specific actions and decisions that
patent examiners must make about patent applications they review during a
two-week period.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO
REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 2 (2007), available at http://www
.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2012). Implicit in these
goals is an estimate of the time it takes to review a patent application. See id.
at 7.
287. The amount of time the Patent Office allots for an examiner to dispose
of a case depends on factors like seniority and the technology involved. See id.
Time estimates vary. Compare Thomas, Collusion, supra note 2, at 314 (estimating a sixteen- to seventeen-hour average time allotment), with Lemley,
Rational Ignorance, supra note 11, at 1500 n.19 (aggregating time estimates,
which range from eight to thirty-two hours, depending on the industry). As a
part of internal patent reform, the Patent Office has reevaluated examination
timelines. See supra note 27.
288. See supra note 285. This is particularly problematic in nascent, rapidly changing, or highly specialized fields where there is a paucity of relevant
patent literature. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 21, at 51 (explaining that while
the Patent Office’s accessible information sources might be sufficient to gauge
patentability for mechanical and chemical fields, this may not be true in fields
like software where the relevant information is inaccessible to the Patent Office).
289. See supra note 131 (discussing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012)).
290. See supra notes 129–31, 285 and accompanying text.
291. See sources cited supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
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292

patentability, placing the burden of persuasion on the applicant combined with the presumption of unpatentability would
compel the applicant (rather than the examiner) to furnish information in close cases to carry the burden of proof and ulti293
mately prevail. If the applicant could not do so, a patent
294
would not issue—which is not necessarily a bad outcome. On
the other hand, if a patent issues, it would be of higher quality
vis-à-vis one issuing under the current regime because the application would have been subjected to a more robust examination.
But it is important to reiterate that the proposal would not
place additional burdens on the examiner or the Patent Office.
This is very important given the Patent Office’s chronic funding
295
296
concerns and infrastructural limitations. The proposal accepts the idea that “[i]mproving examination efficiency and patent quality should be a ‘mutually shared responsibility’ of both
297
the PTO and patent applicants.” Thus, modifying the evidentiary rules of patent examination to be more evenly balanced

292. See supra Part III.B.1.
293. See supra Part III.A.
294. See infra notes 303–06 and accompanying text.
295. The Patent Office’s current resource problems might stem in part from
a time in the recent past when some of the fee revenue it generated was diverted to the general treasury of the United States for use by other agencies.
See Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1026–29 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(providing a historical account and reporting a Patent Office surplus of $545.1
million from fiscal years 1991 to 2004). At the end of fiscal year 2010,
$814,759,000 in collected fees in the Patent Office’s treasury account were
“unavailable” to the agency. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 74 (2010) (discussing funding limitations). But see Mark A. Lemley, Can the Patent Office Be
Fixed?, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 295, 298–99 (2011) (arguing that fewer issued patents resulted in fewer maintenance fees and led to the Patent Office’s problems in the late 2000s).
296. See supra note 285.
297. Brian E. Mack, Note, PTO Rulemaking in the Twenty-First Century:
Defining the Line Between Strategic Planning and Abuse of Authority, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2105, 2151 (2007) (quoting Letter from Rick D. Nydegger,
Chair, Patent Pub. Advisory Comm. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to
Honorable Jon Dudas, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. 1 (May
3, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/
comments/fpp_continuation/ppac.pdf); see also Steve Lohr, U.S. Seeking Stricter Rules on Qualifying for a Patent, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at C3 (quoting
Jon Dudas, then Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
as stating: “There ought to be a shared responsibility for patent quality among
the patent office, the applicants and the public . . . . If everything is done right
at the front end, we’ll have to worry a lot less about litigation later.”).

1042

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:990

between the examiner and the applicant comports with existing
298
patent policy and is worthy of consideration.
2. Filing Behavior
There is no doubt that the proposed regime would affect filing behavior. Faced with the presumption of unpatentability
and the possible need to adduce proof, inventors with trivial or
underdeveloped inventions contemplating a patent might real299
ize that pursuing one would be a waste of time and money.
This would leave the inventor with two options. The first option
would be not to file at all. Further product development might
reveal, for example, that the invention would be technically infeasible or unlikely to gain much attention in the market300
place. The inventor could conclude that the potential value of
a conceived idea is not great enough to justify the expense of
adducing sufficient proof for an inevitable fight over patentabil301
ity. For the patent system the upsides are many: one less application to be examined (and thus one less application to
strain Patent Office resources and exacerbate the application
302
overload problem), the derailment of an assuredly low-quality
303
304
patent, one less obstacle for other inventors, and one less
patent document whose disclosure would add nothing to the
305
public storehouse of technical knowledge. So forgoing a pa306
tent in this context is not a bad result.
298. See Patent Quality Improvement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 24 (2003) (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University) (arguing that “the imposition of modest increases in
the responsibilities of patent applicants,” such as asking them to perform a
prior art search, “strikes many observers as a sound policy choice,” “comports
with existing patent policies,” and is “worthy of extended consideration”).
299. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 175.
300. Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 88–93. Of course, an invention which is technically infeasible probably has little market worth. Id. at
123.
301. Cf. id. at 124 (using similar language in the context of an actual reduction to practice requirement). This scenario is one in which “some ideas
will simply not make it.” Id.
302. Id. at 104–05; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
303. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1369 (2009) (“Higher quality patents mean that
fewer patents will be granted.”).
304. See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 207, 210 (2006) (discussing patent obstacles).
305. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available
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The second option is to postpone filing until the invention
307
is “further down the technology path.” Indeed, patent law
contemplates that the inventor might spend some time perfect308
ing the invention before filing.
From a policy perspective
much good can come from the former; including better inven309
310
tions, more efficient patent examination, improved patent
311
312
313
quality, reduced uncertainty, and better disclosure.
it adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate ideas
and promote technological development); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390,
1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full and complete disclosure of how to make and use the claimed invention “adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse”).
306. See sources cited supra note 2 (describing the kind of low quality patents that have resulted from the current system).
307. Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 122.
308. Although the patent laws encourage prompt filing, “the public interest
is also deemed to be served by allowing an inventor time to perfect his invention.” TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir.
1984). So, while public use of the invention more than one year prior to filing
can bar issuance of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a judicially created doctrine known as the experimental use exception can negate the bar by affording
the inventor time to improve and perfect the invention. See City of Elizabeth v.
Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134–37 (1877) (articulating the experimental use doctrine); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d
1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (listing objective criteria for determining if a use is
experimental).
309. Further development and refinement of the invention “produce a better invention—whether it be safer, cheaper, more efficient, more durable, or
more effective.” Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 654. When
the refined embodiments are described and claimed, “the patentee can better
protect the embodiment being marketed since it is that embodiment which
competitors will likely target” and perhaps try to design around. Id. Further,
forcing competitors to design around an invention lies at the heart of competition and ultimately benefits the consumer when competitors produce better
and cheaper products. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226,
1235–36 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
310. For example, if the invention is actually reduced to practice at the
time of filing, it is much easier for the examiner to gauge compliance with the
enablement requirement. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at
653 (arguing that working examples provide the best evidence “because . . . nothing is left to speculation or doubt.”). Relatedly, the applicant’s
ability to provide more technical information about the invention allows for a
more robust examination and mitigates the examiner’s information deficit. See
discussion supra Part I.C.1.
311. That delayed filing allows the applicant to generate more technical
information about the invention and allows for a more robust examination
which translates into improved patent quality. See supra notes 282–83 and
accompanying text.
312. As Professor Christopher Cotropia explains:
Additional technical information and definition reduce the uncertainty surrounding the invention before examination begins. The in-
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Any discussion of delayed filing can be contentious given
314
the oft-touted benefits of early filing in patent law. Debates
over the timing issue will certainly continue as the recent pas315
sage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) will convert the United States from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor316
to-file patent system. Under the proposed regime, an applicant might face a tradeoff between more pre-filing work and
diligence (in part to adduce sufficient proof to prove patentabil-

ventor gains a better handle on whether the invention provides the
wanted results. Furthermore, the additional time that passes while
[development] is occurring produces more information of its own. This
all places the actual examination forward in time, giving the inventor
more certainty as to the invention’s ultimate commercial worth.
Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 123 (citing Michael Abramowicz,
The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065,
1075–76 (2007)).
313. “The resulting patent, by disclosing the post-conception refinements to
the invention, will ‘provide[] the public a readily available teaching of the most
practicable device.’” Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 172, at 654 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Petitioner at 9, Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (No.
97-1130)).
314. See Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551,
558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting an interpretation of § 112 which would “subvert
the patent system’s goal of promoting the useful arts through encouraging early disclosure”); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.”). Compare John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 445 (2004) (arguing that early filing leads to reduced patent terms,
thereby dedicating the invention to the public at an earlier time), and Kitch,
Nature and Function, supra note 187, at 269–80 (arguing that early filing facilitates commercialization, coordinates the development of technology, and
reduces wasteful duplicative efforts by competitors), with Seymore, Teaching
Function, supra note 172, at 659–61 (arguing that ex ante incentives which
encourage early filing can thwart innovation), and Cotropia, Early Filing, supra note 175, at 88–119 (discussing the costs of early filing).
315. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
316. See id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and repealing 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)). The difference matters when two or more parties
independently develop the same or similar invention around the same time.
Under the first-to-invent system, “the patent will be awarded to the applicant
who was the first inventor in fact . . . even if the first inventor was not the first
person to file a patent application directed towards that invention.” Schacht &
Thomas, supra note 281, at 10. Under the first-inventor-to-file system, “the
inventor who first filed an application at the patent office is presumptively entitled to the patent,” thereby making the question of “[w]hether or not the first
applicant was actually the first individual to complete the invention in the
field . . . irrelevant.” Id. at 10–11.
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ity) and the perceived need to race to the Patent Office with the
317
underdeveloped invention (and hope for the best).
318
While it is certainly true that the AIA redefines prior art,
it is far from clear how the first-inventor-to-file system will affect filing behavior. To illustrate, consider the general rule under the AIA that any disclosure by a third party before the in319
ventor’s filing date will ordinarily defeat patentability.
However, a third-party disclosure will not qualify as prior art if
within one year of filing either the inventor had already dis320
closed the invention before the third party or the third party
321
somehow derived its disclosure from the inventor. Surveying
this new landscape, Professors Dennis Crouch and Jason
Rantanen suggest that inventors will have two low-cost options
322
to secure an early filing date. One is to file a provisional pat323
ent application—an option available under existing law. The

317. To the extent that the first-inventor-to-file regime forces inventors to
race to the Patent Office, this “would encourage premature and sketchy technological disclosures in hastily-filed patent applications.” Schacht & Thomas,
supra note 281, at 11 (citing Coe A. Bloomberg, In Defense of the First-toInvent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 260 (1993)).
318. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–86
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 102); Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America
Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 22–87 (2012)
(discussing the AIA’s prior art provisions). The changes will apply to patent
applications with an effective filing date after March 16, 2013. See id. § 3, 125
Stat. at 288.
319. Id. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (to be codified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)). By
contrast, under the current regime, a one-year grace period applies to disclosures made by the inventor or third parties before filing. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2006).
320. America Invents Act § 3, 125 Stat. at 286 (to be codified as 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(1)(B)).
321. Id. (to be codified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)).
322. See Dennis Crouch, Disclosure under the AIA: Introducing The Poor
Man’s Provisional Patent Application, PATENTLY-O (Sep. 21, 2011, 6:16 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/disclosure-under-the-aia-the-poor
-mans-provisional-patent-application.html [hereinafter Crouch, Disclosure
Under the AIA]; Jason Rantanen, The Effects of the America Invents Act on
Technological Disclosure, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 8, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www
.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/the-effects-of-the-america-invents-act-on
-technological-disclosure.html.
323. A provisional patent application (PPA) allows an inventor to obtain an
early filing date for the invention before the inventor is ready to draft a claim
or a full application. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006). A PPA is not examined and
only requires a minimal filing fee. Id. The inventor must, however, submit a
regular, “nonprovisional” application within one year, or the PPA is automatically abandoned. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1). In short, the PPA provides an inventor
with an easy and inexpensive mode of entry into the U.S. patent system.
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other is to simply make an early, pre-filing disclosure. The ultimate choice of whether or when to file or disclose will depend
325
on the inventor’s overall patenting strategy.
CONCLUSION
It is far too easy to get a (bad) patent. Despite administrative, legislative, and judicial efforts at patent reform, it is still
the case that anyone who files a patent application on anything
will eventually get a patent. This is because the presumption of
patentability and allocations of burdens of proof put applicants
in a favorable position from the very outset of patent examination. As this Article has shown, many of the pressing problems
in the patent system can be traced to this paradigm. The situation is much different under the proposed regime which rebalances the scales of patentability. By placing a heavier burden upon the applicant, getting a patent would be far from
guaranteed. This would cure many ills of the patent system and
promote broader goals of patent policy.

324. Professor Crouch has explained the benefits of this option:
Self-disclosure offers similar benefits to that of a provisional application in that it is cheap with few formalities and provides an additional year of delay. In fact, public disclosure should be cheaper and
easier than filing a provisional application. In the same way that a
provisional application is seen as a poor man’s patent application, I
suggest that public disclosure will be seen as a poor man’s provisional
application or a "really poor man’s patent application.” The disclosure
allows an applicant to buy an additional year of delay with few capital
expenditures and without losing patent term but instead merely shifting the term forward in time.
Crouch, Disclosure Under the AIA, supra note 322.
325. An important constraint on a PPA is that it must include a written
description which satisfies the requirements of § 112. New Railhead Mfg.,
L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Pre-filing
disclosure might cause problems for inventors who contemplate filing abroad.
The one-year grace period available in the United States is not available in
many foreign countries. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. Most of them have an absolute novelty requirement such that any pre-filing disclosure, including activity by the inventor, is patent-defeating. Id. Accordingly, if foreign filing is a
possibility, the applicant must take steps to avoid inadvertent or premature
disclosure.

